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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC PATCH v2 for-4.5] x86/hvm: Further restrict access to x2apic MSRs
>>> On 17.10.14 at 16:49, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> The x2apic specification reserves the entire MSR range 0x800-0xbff, while only
> the first 0x3f MSRs have defined purposes. All reserved MSRs in this region
> are architecturally required to raise #GP faults upon access.
>
> Xen used to pass this entire range to hvm_x2apic_msr_{read,write}(), but the
> range was restricted somewhat by XSA-108 (c/s 61fdda7ac) to prevent guests
> being able to read pages adjacent to the domheap page backing the vlapic->regs
> array.
>
> While removing the vulnerability, a side effect of XSA-108 was that the MSR
> range 0x900-0xbff fell through the switch statement and ends up reading the
> hosts x2apic range. This behaviour is a problem in general, but specifically
> it turns out that MSRs 0xa00 and 0xa01 are implemented (but undocumented) on
0xa00..0xa02
> certain SandyBridge and IvyBridge systems.
>
> Experimentally, no operating system in XenServer's test suite (including all
> versions of Windows currently supported by Microsoft) ever peek at these
> MSRs,
> even on hosts where some of them are implemented.
>
> This patch undoes the patch to XSA-108, returning the primary bounds check to
"undoes the patch to XSA-108"?
> the entire specified range. It changes hvm_x2apic_msr_read() to a whitelist
> approach, which avoids the vulnerability, and provides a more
> architecturally
> accurate emulation of the reserved MSRs (which would previously read as 0
> rather than fault).
Mention that hvm_x2apic_msr_write() already uses a white list
approach and hence doesn't need changing?
> This is RFC because I have not yet functionally tested it, and I would
> appreciate feedback on the approach.
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
with one minor change suggestion:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vlapic.c
> @@ -649,19 +649,38 @@ int hvm_x2apic_msr_read(struct vcpu *v, unsigned int
> msr, uint64_t *msr_content)
> if ( !vlapic_x2apic_mode(vlapic) )
> return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
>
> - vlapic_read_aligned(vlapic, offset, &low);
> switch ( offset )
> {
> case APIC_ICR:
> vlapic_read_aligned(vlapic, APIC_ICR2, &high);
> + /* Fallthrough. */
> + case APIC_ID:
> + case APIC_LVR:
> + case APIC_TASKPRI:
> + case APIC_PROCPRI:
> + case APIC_LDR:
> + case APIC_SPIV:
> + case APIC_ISR ... APIC_ISR + 0x70:
> + case APIC_TMR ... APIC_TMR + 0x70:
> + case APIC_IRR ... APIC_IRR + 0x70:
> + case APIC_ESR:
> + case APIC_CMCI:
> + case APIC_LVTT:
> + case APIC_LVTTHMR:
> + case APIC_LVTPC:
> + case APIC_LVT0:
> + case APIC_LVT1:
> + case APIC_LVTERR:
> + case APIC_TMICT:
> + case APIC_TMCCT:
> + case APIC_TDCR:
> break;
>
> - case APIC_EOI:
> - case APIC_ICR2:
> - case APIC_SELF_IPI:
> + default:
> return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
> }
>
> + vlapic_read_aligned(vlapic, offset, &low);
If you move this up into the switch statement, the compiler will have
a chance to warn about "low" being uninitialized for any unintentional
(future) code path falling out through the bottom of the switch
statement. But I'm not insisting on it - if you decide to keep it the
way is it, the R-b stands anyway.
Jan
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