[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2 2/4] xen: introduce grant_map_exists
>>> On 06.10.14 at 16:57, <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On Mon, 6 Oct 2014, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >>> On 06.10.14 at 16:34, <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> > On Mon, 6 Oct 2014, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >> >>> On 06.10.14 at 15:46, <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> > On Mon, 6 Oct 2014, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >> >> >>> On 06.10.14 at 15:08, <stefano.stabellini@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >> >> > The other approach to do this, that I avoided because it is slower (2 >> >> >> > spinlocks instead of 1), is to use the existing mapcount function. >> >> >> > mapcount is based on: >> >> >> > >> >> >> > for ( handle = 0; handle < lgt->maptrack_limit; handle++ ) >> >> >> > >> >> >> > do you think it is better? >> >> >> >> >> >> No, that's worse: This is the Dom0 side of things, and the loop >> >> >> bound would still be controlled by that same command line option. >> >> >> >> >> >> So between the two, the original solution would be better, and >> >> >> maybe enforcing a lower limit on DomU-s might actually be an >> >> >> option. >> >> > >> >> > What about keeping track of the highest ref number actually used so far? >> >> > I could use that as upper limit instead of the theoretical max. It would >> >> > also make the execution faster. >> >> >> >> But the loops are already using a value on the order of the high >> >> watermark, not the theoretical one. I.e. you're not alway looping >> >> for a long time, it is just possible for this to happen. >> > >> > OK, I understand. >> > >> > The default max value is 32 pages that lead to 16384 iterations in >> > grant_map_exists. Should I reduce it? >> > >> > Given the simple operations in the loop, the function shouldn't actually >> > be so slow to be a security risk. It should take less that 0.1 >> > milliseconds to complete. >> >> I don't think there's problem with the default (i.e. no reason to reduce >> that value). But bumping the limit via command line option should still >> result in a secure system. Therefore I think the limit should be split to >> separate Dom0 and DomU ones (e.g. along the lines of the >> "extra_guest_irqs=" option), and the DomU limit should then get >> bounded more strictly. > > That makes sense. > Would you prefer having the changes as part of this series or separately? It needs to be a prereq to what the series does - including it in the series would therefore seem reasonable, but not a strict requirement. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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