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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V9 4/5] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc

>>> On 29.08.14 at 09:44, <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> I do understand the preference for a VCPU-based mechanism from a
> concurrency point of view, but that would simply potentially fail for
> us, hence defeating the purpose of the patch. I'm also not sure how that
> would be useful in the general case either, since the same problem that
> applies to us would seem to apply to the general case as well.

Yeah, the whole thing probably needs a bit more thinking so that the
interface doesn't end up being a BitDefender-special. Indeed together
with the address space qualification, the interface might not be very
useful when made vCPU-bound. And taking it a little further into the
"generic" direction, allowing this to only inject #PF doesn't make a
very nice interface either. Plus we already have HVMOP_inject_trap,
i.e. your first line of thinking (and eventual explaining as the
motivation for a patch) should be why that can't be used.


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