[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V3 4/5] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
On 07/24/2014 03:41 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote: > On 24/07/14 13:38, Ian Jackson wrote: >> Andrei LUTAS writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V3 4/5] xen, libxc: Request >> page fault injection via libxc"): >>> The logic with the #PF injection goes like this: >> Sorry, I didn't see this message when I sent my last one asking about >> the motivation. >> >>> - The memory introspection engine wants to inspect (for whatever reason) a >>> virtual page X insidevirtual address space Y(inside user-mode, although >>> with proper knowledge about the guest kernel,one can also inject #PF >>> inside >>> kernel-mode on Windows - proper IRQL, working set trim inactive, etc.) >> I don't understand why this needs additional hypervisor code. Can >> this not be done by negotiating with the paging daemon ? >> >> Ian. > > The purpose of this is to play with the paging algorithm inside the > guest OS, which can only be done from outside by providing pagefaults > when considered safe to do so. > > This has nothing to do with xen-paging transparently playing with the > guest physical address space behind the guests back. Thanks, you beat me to it :) Razvan Cojocaru _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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