[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V3 4/5] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc
Andrei LUTAS writes ("Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V3 4/5] xen, libxc: Request page fault injection via libxc"): > The logic with the #PF injection goes like this: Sorry, I didn't see this message when I sent my last one asking about the motivation. > - The memory introspection engine wants to inspect (for whatever reason) a > virtual page X insidevirtual address space Y(inside user-mode, although > with proper knowledge about the guest kernel,one can also inject #PF > inside > kernel-mode on Windows - proper IRQL, working set trim inactive, etc.) I don't understand why this needs additional hypervisor code. Can this not be done by negotiating with the paging daemon ? Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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