[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V2 3/6] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events
On 11/07/14 19:09, Razvan Cojocaru wrote: > On 07/11/2014 08:03 PM, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> On 11/07/14 16:43, Razvan Cojocaru wrote: >>> Vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() will now refuse to disable interception of >>> MSRs needed for memory introspection. It is not possible to gate this on >>> mem_access being active for the domain, since by the time mem_access does >>> become active the interception for the interesting MSRs has already been >>> disabled (vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() runs very early on). >>> >>> Changes since V1: >>> - Replaced printk() with gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, ...). >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> >>> --- >>> xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ >>> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) >>> >>> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c >>> index 8ffc562..35fcfcc 100644 >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c >>> @@ -700,6 +700,24 @@ void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 >>> msr, int type) >>> if ( msr_bitmap == NULL ) >>> return; >>> >>> + /* Filter out MSR-s needed for memory introspection */ >>> + switch ( msr ) >> This absolutely must be gated on mem_events being enabled for the domain. >> >> It is too much of a performance penalty to apply to domains which are >> not being introspected. > I understand, but it really runs very early on, and the mem_event part > comes in after the MSR interception is disabled. This effectively > renders a lot of memory introspection functionality useless. In which case the hypercall which enables mem_event needs to prod the vmcs state an explicitly enable intercepts for these MSRs. (and conversly re-disables intercepts if mem_events are disabled) You can probably get away with hvm_funcs to enable and disable mem events. ~Andrew _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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