[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH RFC V2 3/6] xen: Force-enable relevant MSR events; optimize the number of sent MSR events
On 11/07/14 16:43, Razvan Cojocaru wrote: > Vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() will now refuse to disable interception of > MSRs needed for memory introspection. It is not possible to gate this on > mem_access being active for the domain, since by the time mem_access does > become active the interception for the interesting MSRs has already been > disabled (vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr() runs very early on). > > Changes since V1: > - Replaced printk() with gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, ...). > > Signed-off-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx> > --- > xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c > index 8ffc562..35fcfcc 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmcs.c > @@ -700,6 +700,24 @@ void vmx_disable_intercept_for_msr(struct vcpu *v, u32 > msr, int type) > if ( msr_bitmap == NULL ) > return; > > + /* Filter out MSR-s needed for memory introspection */ > + switch ( msr ) This absolutely must be gated on mem_events being enabled for the domain. It is too much of a performance penalty to apply to domains which are not being introspected. > + { > + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP: > + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP: > + case MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS: > + case MSR_IA32_MC0_CTL: > + case MSR_STAR: > + case MSR_LSTAR: > + > + gdprintk(XENLOG_DEBUG, "MSR 0x%08x needed for " > + "memory introspection, still intercepted\n", msr); I you are going to split this line then do it at the %08x so the string is still grepable. How often do these messages trigger? It seems like it could be contribute to a lot of logspam. > + return; > + > + default: > + break; > + } > + > /* > * See Intel PRM Vol. 3, 20.6.9 (MSR-Bitmap Address). Early manuals > * have the write-low and read-high bitmap offsets the wrong way round. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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