[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] Bisected Xen-unstable: "Segment register inaccessible for d1v0" when starting HVM guest on intel
>>> On 02.07.14 at 11:44, <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 02/07/14 10:28, Jan Beulich wrote: >> This being a PV extension to the base architecture, the hardware >> specification is meaningless. What we need to do here is _extend_ what >> the hardware has specified for those extra accesses. We have three >> options basically: >> 1) never do any checking on such accesses >> 2) honor CPL and EFLAGS.AC >> 3) always do the checking >> The first one obviously is bad from a security POV. Since the third one is >> more strict than the second and since I assume adding some override is >> going to be the simpler change than altering the point in time when the >> VMCS gets loaded during context switch (the suggestion of which no one >> at all commented on so far), I'd prefer that one, but wouldn't mind >> option 2 to be implemented instead. > > The problem is not the hypervisor check. We are already deep within an > hvm_copy_to_user() which is between a stac()/clac() pair. > > The issue is that guest_walk_tables() is checking a Xen access using > guest page tables as if it were a supervisor access given the current > context of the vcpu. And I only ever referred to the checking done there; the hypervisor access is of no concern here. > What can/should Xen do if its emulated access fails with a guest SMAP > violations? It certainly can't/shouldn't inject a pagefault, nor should > it actually fail the write. copy_to_user() is not subject to the guest > operating mode and whether we are writing into guest user or supervisor > pages. Just like copy_to_user() would produce -EFAULT for a hypercall when used on a non-present page or a non-canonical address, it should (and afaict will with how things are right now) similarly produce -EFAULT for an attempted access to a guest-accessible page when the current mode of the guest is supervisor. To me it is a logical extension to also fail accesses outside of hypercalls or emulation. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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