Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 4/6] x86/hvm: Add SMAP support to HVM guest

[Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 15/04/14 14:02, Feng Wu wrote:
> Intel new CPU supports SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention).
> SMAP prevents supervisor-mode accesses to any linear address with
> a valid translation for which the U/S flag (bit 2) is 1 in every
> paging-structure entry controlling the translation for the linear
> address.
>
> This patch enable SMAP for HVM geust.
>
> Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
> ---
>  xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c        |  3 +++
>  xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c  | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
>  xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 13 +++++++++++++
>  3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> index b0da8e7..b52476d 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -3036,6 +3036,9 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsigned int *eax, 
> unsigned int *ebx,
>          if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smep )
>              *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP);
>  
> +        if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smap )
> +            *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
> +
>          /* Don't expose MPX to hvm when VMX support is not available */
>          if ( (count == 0) &&
>               (!(vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) ||
> diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> index 70460b6..1d5f1fc 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
> @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
>  #include <xen/sched.h>
>  #include <asm/page.h>
>  #include <asm/guest_pt.h>
> +#include <asm/hvm/vmx/vmx.h>
>  
>  
>  /* Flags that are needed in a pagetable entry, with the sense of NX inverted 
> */
> @@ -144,14 +145,18 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain 
> *p2m,
>      guest_l4e_t *l4p;
>  #endif
>      uint32_t gflags, mflags, iflags, rc = 0;
> -    int smep;
> +    int smep, smap;
>      bool_t pse1G = 0, pse2M = 0;
> +    unsigned long sel = 0;
> +    uint64_t eflags = guest_cpu_user_regs()->eflags;
>      p2m_query_t qt = P2M_ALLOC | P2M_UNSHARE;
>  
>      perfc_incr(guest_walk);
>      memset(gw, 0, sizeof(*gw));
>      gw->va = va;
>  
> +    __vmread(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, &sel);
> +
>      /* Mandatory bits that must be set in every entry.  We invert NX and
>       * the invalid bits, to calculate as if there were an "X" bit that
>       * allowed access.  We will accumulate, in rc, the set of flags that
> @@ -165,7 +170,21 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>       * whole walk as if it were a user-mode one and then invert the answer. 
> */
>      smep = (is_hvm_vcpu(v) && hvm_smep_enabled(v) 
>              && (pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch) && !(pfec & PFEC_user_mode) );
> -    if ( smep )
> +
> +    /*
> +     * SMAP: kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode mappings should fault
> +     * A fault is considered as a SMAP violation if the following
> +     * conditions come ture:
> +     *   - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4
> +     *   - An user page is accessed
> +     *   - CPL = 3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC clear set)

"X86_EFLAGS_AC clear set" ? What do you mean by this?

~Andrew

> +     *   - Page fault in kernel mode
> +     */
> +    smap = ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) && hvm_smap_enabled(v)
> +            && !(!((sel & 3) == 3) && (eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC))
> +            && !(pfec & PFEC_user_mode) );
> +
> +    if ( smep || smap )
>          mflags |= _PAGE_USER;
>  
>  #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3 /* PAE or 64... */
> @@ -338,8 +357,8 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
>  #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 64-bit only... */
>  set_ad:
>  #endif
> -    /* Now re-invert the user-mode requirement for SMEP. */
> -    if ( smep ) 
> +    /* Now re-invert the user-mode requirement for SMEP and SMAP */
> +    if ( smep || smap )
>          rc ^= _PAGE_USER;
>  
>      /* Go back and set accessed and dirty bits only if the walk was a
> diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
> index dcc3483..b703b93 100644
> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
> @@ -257,6 +257,8 @@ int hvm_girq_dest_2_vcpu_id(struct domain *d, uint8_t 
> dest, uint8_t dest_mode);
>      (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_PAE))
>  #define hvm_smep_enabled(v) \
>      (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & 
> X86_CR4_SMEP))
> +#define hvm_smap_enabled(v) \
> +    (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & 
> X86_CR4_SMAP))
>  #define hvm_nx_enabled(v) \
>      (!!((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_efer & EFER_NX))
>  
> @@ -363,6 +365,16 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(struct vcpu *v)
>  #define HVM_CR4_HOST_MASK (mmu_cr4_features & \
>      (X86_CR4_VMXE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_MCE))
>  
> +static inline bool_t hvm_cpuid_has_smap(void)
> +{
> +    unsigned int eax = 0, ebx = 0, ecx = 0, edx = 0;
> +    unsigned int leaf = 0x7;
> +
> +    hvm_cpuid(leaf, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
> +
> +    return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP));
> +}
> +
>  /* These bits in CR4 cannot be set by the guest. */
>  #define HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(_v)                 \
>      (~((unsigned long)                                  \
> @@ -371,6 +383,7 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(struct vcpu *v)
>          X86_CR4_MCE | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE |       \
>          X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT |           \
>          (cpu_has_smep ? X86_CR4_SMEP : 0) |             \
> +        (hvm_cpuid_has_smap() ? X86_CR4_SMAP : 0) |     \
>          (cpu_has_fsgsbase ? X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) |     \
>          ((nestedhvm_enabled((_v)->domain) && cpu_has_vmx)\
>                        ? X86_CR4_VMXE : 0)  |             \


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