[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 4/6] x86/hvm: Add SMAP support to HVM guest
Intel new CPU supports SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention). SMAP prevents supervisor-mode accesses to any linear address with a valid translation for which the U/S flag (bit 2) is 1 in every paging-structure entry controlling the translation for the linear address. This patch enable SMAP for HVM geust. Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx> --- xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 3 +++ xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 13 +++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c index b0da8e7..b52476d 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c @@ -3036,6 +3036,9 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsigned int *eax, unsigned int *ebx, if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smep ) *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP); + if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smap ) + *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP); + /* Don't expose MPX to hvm when VMX support is not available */ if ( (count == 0) && (!(vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) || diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c index 70460b6..1d5f1fc 100644 --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ #include <xen/sched.h> #include <asm/page.h> #include <asm/guest_pt.h> +#include <asm/hvm/vmx/vmx.h> /* Flags that are needed in a pagetable entry, with the sense of NX inverted */ @@ -144,14 +145,18 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, guest_l4e_t *l4p; #endif uint32_t gflags, mflags, iflags, rc = 0; - int smep; + int smep, smap; bool_t pse1G = 0, pse2M = 0; + unsigned long sel = 0; + uint64_t eflags = guest_cpu_user_regs()->eflags; p2m_query_t qt = P2M_ALLOC | P2M_UNSHARE; perfc_incr(guest_walk); memset(gw, 0, sizeof(*gw)); gw->va = va; + __vmread(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, &sel); + /* Mandatory bits that must be set in every entry. We invert NX and * the invalid bits, to calculate as if there were an "X" bit that * allowed access. We will accumulate, in rc, the set of flags that @@ -165,7 +170,21 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, * whole walk as if it were a user-mode one and then invert the answer. */ smep = (is_hvm_vcpu(v) && hvm_smep_enabled(v) && (pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch) && !(pfec & PFEC_user_mode) ); - if ( smep ) + + /* + * SMAP: kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode mappings should fault + * A fault is considered as a SMAP violation if the following + * conditions come ture: + * - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4 + * - An user page is accessed + * - CPL = 3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC clear set) + * - Page fault in kernel mode + */ + smap = ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) && hvm_smap_enabled(v) + && !(!((sel & 3) == 3) && (eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC)) + && !(pfec & PFEC_user_mode) ); + + if ( smep || smap ) mflags |= _PAGE_USER; #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3 /* PAE or 64... */ @@ -338,8 +357,8 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m, #if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 64-bit only... */ set_ad: #endif - /* Now re-invert the user-mode requirement for SMEP. */ - if ( smep ) + /* Now re-invert the user-mode requirement for SMEP and SMAP */ + if ( smep || smap ) rc ^= _PAGE_USER; /* Go back and set accessed and dirty bits only if the walk was a diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h index dcc3483..b703b93 100644 --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h @@ -257,6 +257,8 @@ int hvm_girq_dest_2_vcpu_id(struct domain *d, uint8_t dest, uint8_t dest_mode); (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_PAE)) #define hvm_smep_enabled(v) \ (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_SMEP)) +#define hvm_smap_enabled(v) \ + (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_SMAP)) #define hvm_nx_enabled(v) \ (!!((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_efer & EFER_NX)) @@ -363,6 +365,16 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(struct vcpu *v) #define HVM_CR4_HOST_MASK (mmu_cr4_features & \ (X86_CR4_VMXE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_MCE)) +static inline bool_t hvm_cpuid_has_smap(void) +{ + unsigned int eax = 0, ebx = 0, ecx = 0, edx = 0; + unsigned int leaf = 0x7; + + hvm_cpuid(leaf, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx); + + return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP)); +} + /* These bits in CR4 cannot be set by the guest. */ #define HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(_v) \ (~((unsigned long) \ @@ -371,6 +383,7 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(struct vcpu *v) X86_CR4_MCE | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | \ X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | \ (cpu_has_smep ? X86_CR4_SMEP : 0) | \ + (hvm_cpuid_has_smap() ? X86_CR4_SMAP : 0) | \ (cpu_has_fsgsbase ? X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) | \ ((nestedhvm_enabled((_v)->domain) && cpu_has_vmx)\ ? X86_CR4_VMXE : 0) | \ -- 1.8.3.1 _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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