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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH v1 4/6] x86/hvm: Add SMAP support to HVM guest
Intel new CPU supports SMAP (Supervisor Mode Access Prevention).
SMAP prevents supervisor-mode accesses to any linear address with
a valid translation for which the U/S flag (bit 2) is 1 in every
paging-structure entry controlling the translation for the linear
address.
This patch enable SMAP for HVM geust.
Signed-off-by: Feng Wu <feng.wu@xxxxxxxxx>
---
xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c | 3 +++
xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h | 13 +++++++++++++
3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index b0da8e7..b52476d 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -3036,6 +3036,9 @@ void hvm_cpuid(unsigned int input, unsigned int *eax,
unsigned int *ebx,
if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smep )
*ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMEP);
+ if ( (count == 0) && !cpu_has_smap )
+ *ebx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP);
+
/* Don't expose MPX to hvm when VMX support is not available */
if ( (count == 0) &&
(!(vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) ||
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
index 70460b6..1d5f1fc 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/guest_walk.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <xen/sched.h>
#include <asm/page.h>
#include <asm/guest_pt.h>
+#include <asm/hvm/vmx/vmx.h>
/* Flags that are needed in a pagetable entry, with the sense of NX inverted */
@@ -144,14 +145,18 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
guest_l4e_t *l4p;
#endif
uint32_t gflags, mflags, iflags, rc = 0;
- int smep;
+ int smep, smap;
bool_t pse1G = 0, pse2M = 0;
+ unsigned long sel = 0;
+ uint64_t eflags = guest_cpu_user_regs()->eflags;
p2m_query_t qt = P2M_ALLOC | P2M_UNSHARE;
perfc_incr(guest_walk);
memset(gw, 0, sizeof(*gw));
gw->va = va;
+ __vmread(GUEST_CS_SELECTOR, &sel);
+
/* Mandatory bits that must be set in every entry. We invert NX and
* the invalid bits, to calculate as if there were an "X" bit that
* allowed access. We will accumulate, in rc, the set of flags that
@@ -165,7 +170,21 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
* whole walk as if it were a user-mode one and then invert the answer. */
smep = (is_hvm_vcpu(v) && hvm_smep_enabled(v)
&& (pfec & PFEC_insn_fetch) && !(pfec & PFEC_user_mode) );
- if ( smep )
+
+ /*
+ * SMAP: kernel-mode data accesses from user-mode mappings should fault
+ * A fault is considered as a SMAP violation if the following
+ * conditions come ture:
+ * - X86_CR4_SMAP is set in CR4
+ * - An user page is accessed
+ * - CPL = 3 or X86_EFLAGS_AC clear set)
+ * - Page fault in kernel mode
+ */
+ smap = ( is_hvm_vcpu(v) && hvm_smap_enabled(v)
+ && !(!((sel & 3) == 3) && (eflags & X86_EFLAGS_AC))
+ && !(pfec & PFEC_user_mode) );
+
+ if ( smep || smap )
mflags |= _PAGE_USER;
#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 3 /* PAE or 64... */
@@ -338,8 +357,8 @@ guest_walk_tables(struct vcpu *v, struct p2m_domain *p2m,
#if GUEST_PAGING_LEVELS >= 4 /* 64-bit only... */
set_ad:
#endif
- /* Now re-invert the user-mode requirement for SMEP. */
- if ( smep )
+ /* Now re-invert the user-mode requirement for SMEP and SMAP */
+ if ( smep || smap )
rc ^= _PAGE_USER;
/* Go back and set accessed and dirty bits only if the walk was a
diff --git a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
index dcc3483..b703b93 100644
--- a/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -257,6 +257,8 @@ int hvm_girq_dest_2_vcpu_id(struct domain *d, uint8_t dest,
uint8_t dest_mode);
(hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_PAE))
#define hvm_smep_enabled(v) \
(hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_SMEP))
+#define hvm_smap_enabled(v) \
+ (hvm_paging_enabled(v) && ((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_cr[4] & X86_CR4_SMAP))
#define hvm_nx_enabled(v) \
(!!((v)->arch.hvm_vcpu.guest_efer & EFER_NX))
@@ -363,6 +365,16 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(struct vcpu *v)
#define HVM_CR4_HOST_MASK (mmu_cr4_features & \
(X86_CR4_VMXE | X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_MCE))
+static inline bool_t hvm_cpuid_has_smap(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax = 0, ebx = 0, ecx = 0, edx = 0;
+ unsigned int leaf = 0x7;
+
+ hvm_cpuid(leaf, &eax, &ebx, &ecx, &edx);
+
+ return !!(ebx & cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_SMAP));
+}
+
/* These bits in CR4 cannot be set by the guest. */
#define HVM_CR4_GUEST_RESERVED_BITS(_v) \
(~((unsigned long) \
@@ -371,6 +383,7 @@ static inline int hvm_event_pending(struct vcpu *v)
X86_CR4_MCE | X86_CR4_PGE | X86_CR4_PCE | \
X86_CR4_OSFXSR | X86_CR4_OSXMMEXCPT | \
(cpu_has_smep ? X86_CR4_SMEP : 0) | \
+ (hvm_cpuid_has_smap() ? X86_CR4_SMAP : 0) | \
(cpu_has_fsgsbase ? X86_CR4_FSGSBASE : 0) | \
((nestedhvm_enabled((_v)->domain) && cpu_has_vmx)\
? X86_CR4_VMXE : 0) | \
--
1.8.3.1
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