Re: [Xen-devel] [RFC] Dom0 PV IOMMU control design (draft A)

[Malcolm Crossley <malcolm.crossley@xxxxxxxxxx>]

On 14/04/14 14:47, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> On 11.04.14 at 19:28, <malcolm.crossley@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>> Purpose
>> =======
>>
>> Allow Xen Domain 0 PV guests to create/modify/destroy IOMMU mappings for
>> hardware devices that Domain 0 has access to. This enables Domain 0 to 
>> program
>> a bus address space mapping which matches it's GPFN mapping. Once a 1-1
>> mapping of GPFN to bus address space is created then a bounce buffer
>> region is not required for the IO devices connected to the IOMMU.
> So the idea then is for the domain to
> - create this 1:1 mapping once at boot, and update it as pages get
>   ballooned int/out, or
> - zap the entire IOMMU mapping at boot, and establish individual
>   mappings as needed based on the driver's use of the DMA map ops?
>

Yes both of those are the general idea, I will document this better in
draft B as per David's suggestion.
The first strategy has better performance (less IOMMU updates) but lower
security from bad devices, the second strategy has better security but
higher IOMMU mapping overhead.

The current idea for maximum performance is to create a 1:1 mapping for
dom0 GPFN's and an offset (offset by max dom0 GPFN) 1:1 mapping for the
whole of the MFN address space which will be used for grant mapped
pages. This should result in IOMMU updates only for ballooned pages.
>> IOMMUOP_unmap_page
>> ----------------
>> First argument, pointer to array of `struct iommu_map_op`
>> Second argument, integer count of `struct iommu_map_op` elements in array
>>
>> This subop will attempt to unmap each element in the `struct 
>> iommu_map_op` array
>> and record the mapping status back into the array itself. If an 
> unmapping?

Agreed
>
>> unmapping fault
> mapping?

This is an unmap hypercall so I believe it would be an unmapping fault
reported.
>
>> occurs then the hypercall stop processing the array and return with an 
>> EFAULT;
> -EFAULT.

Agreed
>> The IOMMU TLB will only be flushed when the hypercall completes or a 
>> hypercall
>> continuation is created.
>>
>>      struct iommu_map_op {
>>          uint64_t bfn;
>>          uint64_t mfn;
>>          uint32_t flags;
>>          int32_t status;
>>      };
>>
>> --------------------------------------------------------------------
>> Field          Purpose
>> -----          -----------------------------------------------------
>> `bfn`          [in] Bus address frame number to be unmapped
>>
>> `mfn`          [in] This field is ignored for unmap subop
>>
>> `flags`        [in] This field is ignored for unmap subop
>>
>> `status`       [out] Mapping status of this unmap operation, 0 indicates 
>> success
> Hmm, bfn and flags ignored would call for an abbreviated interface
> structure. Or how about IOMMU_MAP_OP_{readable,writeable}
> implying unmap, in which case for now you'd need only one op. And
> with that I wonder whether this shouldn't simply be a new
> PHYSDEVOP_iommu_map.

I initially tried to add it to the PHYSDEV hypercall as a subop but when
adding batch capability it seemed cleaner to use a 3 argument hypercall
to allow for the count to be passed in as argument rather than as a
field in a struct.

We could have a single op and define a new flag to indicate we want an
unmap to be performed.
>
>> Security Implications of allowing Domain 0 IOMMU control
>> ========================================================
>>
>> Xen currently allows IO devices attached to Domain 0 to have direct 
>> access to
>> the all of the MFN address space (except Xen hypervisor memory regions),
>> provided the Xen IOMMU option dom0-strict is not enabled.
>>
>> The PV IOMMU feature provides the same level of access to MFN address space
>> and the feature is not enabled when the Xen IOMMU option dom0-strict is
>> enabled. Therefore security is not affected by the PV IOMMU feature.
> While I was about to reply with the same request to extend this to
> driver domains, this last section pretty much excludes such an
> extension. I guess that would benefit from revisiting.

I agree supporting driver domains would not be straightforward with
regards to security so I would suggest that driver domain support could
be added later as a separate design.
>
> Jan
Thank you for your review comments.

Malcolm

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