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Re: [Xen-devel] [V7 PATCH 5/7] pvh: change xsm_add_to_physmap



On 12/16/2013 09:38 PM, Mukesh Rathor wrote:
In preparation for the next patch, we update xsm_add_to_physmap to
allow for checking of foreign domain. Thus, the current domain must
have the right to update the mappings of target domain with pages from
foreign domain.

Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@xxxxxxxxxx>

Acked-by: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>

For some reason I only have v3 and cannot find the v4-v7 patches in
my Inbox, although I do have the copies that came via the xen-devel list.
I recall having some transient email issues during that time, so if
Oracle's mail servers have a more aggressive retry policy the messages
could have been lost due to that; I wasn't intending to ignore your patches.

---
  xen/arch/arm/mm.c       |    4 ++--
  xen/arch/x86/mm.c       |   18 +++++++++++++++---
  xen/include/xsm/dummy.h |   10 ++++++++--
  xen/include/xsm/xsm.h   |    6 +++---
  xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c   |    9 +++++++--
  5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
index 654281a..3515526 100644
--- a/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/arm/mm.c
@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ long arch_memory_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) 
arg)
          if ( d == NULL )
              return -ESRCH;

-        rc = xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d);
+        rc = xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d, NULL);
          if ( rc )
          {
              rcu_unlock_domain(d);
@@ -1165,7 +1165,7 @@ long arch_memory_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) 
arg)
          if ( d == NULL )
              return -ESRCH;

-        rc = xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d);
+        rc = xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d, NULL);
          if ( rc )
          {
              rcu_unlock_domain(d);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
index ae332f4..0cae437 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
@@ -4730,7 +4730,7 @@ long arch_memory_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) 
arg)
          if ( d == NULL )
              return -ESRCH;

-        if ( xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d) )
+        if ( xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d, NULL) )
          {
              rcu_unlock_domain(d);
              return -EPERM;
@@ -4756,7 +4756,7 @@ long arch_memory_op(int op, XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) 
arg)
      case XENMEM_add_to_physmap_range:
      {
          struct xen_add_to_physmap_range xatpr;
-        struct domain *d;
+        struct domain *d, *fd = NULL;

          if ( copy_from_guest(&xatpr, arg, 1) )
              return -EFAULT;
@@ -4769,10 +4769,22 @@ long arch_memory_op(int op, 
XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(void) arg)
          if ( d == NULL )
              return -ESRCH;

-        if ( (rc = xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d)) == 0 )
+        if ( xatpr.space == XENMAPSPACE_gmfn_foreign )
+        {
+            fd = get_pg_owner(xatpr.foreign_domid);
+            if ( fd == NULL )
+            {
+                rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+                return -ESRCH;
+            }
+        }
+        rc = xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_TARGET, current->domain, d, fd);
+        if ( rc == 0 )
              rc = xenmem_add_to_physmap_range(d, &xatpr);

          rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+        if ( fd )
+            put_pg_owner(fd);

          if ( rc == -EAGAIN )
              rc = hypercall_create_continuation(
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
index eb9e1a1..1228e52 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/dummy.h
@@ -467,10 +467,16 @@ static XSM_INLINE int 
xsm_pci_config_permission(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d
      return xsm_default_action(action, current->domain, d);
  }

-static XSM_INLINE int xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d1, 
struct domain *d2)
+static XSM_INLINE int xsm_add_to_physmap(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain *d, 
struct domain *t, struct domain *f)
  {
+    int rc;
+
      XSM_ASSERT_ACTION(XSM_TARGET);
-    return xsm_default_action(action, d1, d2);
+    rc = xsm_default_action(action, d, t);
+    if ( f && !rc )
+        rc = xsm_default_action(action, d, f);
+
+    return rc;
  }

  static XSM_INLINE int xsm_remove_from_physmap(XSM_DEFAULT_ARG struct domain 
*d1, struct domain *d2)
diff --git a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
index 1939453..9ee9543 100644
--- a/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
+++ b/xen/include/xsm/xsm.h
@@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ struct xsm_operations {
      int (*memory_adjust_reservation) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2);
      int (*memory_stat_reservation) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2);
      int (*memory_pin_page) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2, struct 
page_info *page);
-    int (*add_to_physmap) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2);
+    int (*add_to_physmap) (struct domain *d, struct domain *t, struct domain 
*f);
      int (*remove_from_physmap) (struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2);
      int (*claim_pages) (struct domain *d);

@@ -344,9 +344,9 @@ static inline int xsm_memory_pin_page(xsm_default_t def, 
struct domain *d1, stru
      return xsm_ops->memory_pin_page(d1, d2, page);
  }

-static inline int xsm_add_to_physmap(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d1, 
struct domain *d2)
+static inline int xsm_add_to_physmap(xsm_default_t def, struct domain *d, 
struct domain *t, struct domain *f)
  {
-    return xsm_ops->add_to_physmap(d1, d2);
+    return xsm_ops->add_to_physmap(d, t, f);
  }

  static inline int xsm_remove_from_physmap(xsm_default_t def, struct domain 
*d1, struct domain *d2)
diff --git a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
index 7cdef04..81294b1 100644
--- a/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
+++ b/xen/xsm/flask/hooks.c
@@ -1068,9 +1068,14 @@ static inline int flask_tmem_control(void)
      return domain_has_xen(current->domain, XEN__TMEM_CONTROL);
  }

-static int flask_add_to_physmap(struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2)
+static int flask_add_to_physmap(struct domain *d, struct domain *t, struct 
domain *f)
  {
-    return domain_has_perm(d1, d2, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__PHYSMAP);
+    int rc;
+
+    rc = domain_has_perm(d, t, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__PHYSMAP);
+    if ( f && !rc )
+        rc = domain_has_perm(d, f, SECCLASS_MMU, MMU__MAP_READ|MMU__MAP_WRITE);
+    return rc;
  }

  static int flask_remove_from_physmap(struct domain *d1, struct domain *d2)


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