[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v5 12/17] xen/libxc: sched: DOMCTL_*vcpuaffinity works with hard and soft affinity
>>> On 03.12.13 at 19:21, George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 12/03/2013 10:06 AM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>>> On 03.12.13 at 11:02, "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>>>> On 02.12.13 at 19:29, Dario Faggioli <dario.faggioli@xxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >>>> + goto setvcpuaffinity_out; >>>> + >>>> + /* >>>> + * We both set a new affinity and report back to the caller > what >>>> + * the scheduler will be effectively using. >>>> + */ >>>> + if ( vcpuaff->flags & XEN_VCPUAFFINITY_HARD ) >>>> + { >>>> + ret = xenctl_bitmap_to_bitmap(cpumask_bits(new_affinity), >>>> + &vcpuaff->cpumap_hard, >>>> + >>>> vcpuaff->cpumap_hard.nr_bits); >>> >>> There's no code above range checking vcpuaff->cpumap_hard.nr_bits, >>> yet xenctl_bitmap_to_bitmap() uses the passed in value to write into >>> the array pointed to by the first argument. Why is this not >>> xenctl_bitmap_to_cpumask() in the first place? >> >> And just to make it explicit - with fundamental flaws like this, I'm >> not certain anymore whether we really ought to rush this series >> in for 4.4. > > I'm certainly getting nervous about the prospect. However, the above > bug would only be triggered by bad input from domain 0, right? I suppose > even that would be a potential security issue in a highly disaggregated > environment. > > Other bugs in this patch would be similar. This path is taken on domain > creation IIUC; so bugs in this particular patch would probably either be > unexpected behavior of the affinities, or failure to handle unusual > input from a trusted source (domain 0). Now that XSA-77 went out, I can properly respond to this: With disaggregation (as said above), the problem isn't limited to Dom0. While XSA-77 declares all such issues non-security ones for the time being, we should strive to avoid introducing new similar issues. Jan _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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