[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/1 V5] x86/AMD: Fix nested svm crash due to assertion in __virt_to_maddr

On 8/12/2013 8:18 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 12.08.13 at 13:13, "Egger, Christoph" <chegger@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 12.08.13 11:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 12.08.13 at 10:57, "Egger, Christoph" <chegger@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
On 08.08.13 08:47, Jan Beulich wrote:
In any case - explaining how nestedhvm_enabled() could end up
returning a value different from hvm_svm_enabled() would help
my understanding.
nestedhvm_enabled() returns true when 'nestedhvm=1' in the
guest config file.

hvm_svm_enabled() returns true when the hvm guest enabled SVM
in EFER.
And the guest should certainly be disallowed to enable SVM in
EFER when nestedhvm was not 1 in the config file.
That's correct. The guest should also never see SVM available via
Analogous same regarding VMX on Intel.
So Suravee, bottom line from this is: Replace the prior checks
instead of adding the new ones.


Ok... I will replace the hvm_svm_enabled() to check the EFER.SVME bit instead. 
I sent out the V6 on Friday which I have separated the patch into two. 
Would you mind taking one last quick look.

Thank you,

Xen-devel mailing list



Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.