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Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 1/1 V5] x86/AMD: Fix nested svm crash due to assertion in __virt_to_maddr

>>> On 12.08.13 at 13:13, "Egger, Christoph" <chegger@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 12.08.13 11:01, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 12.08.13 at 10:57, "Egger, Christoph" <chegger@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> On 08.08.13 08:47, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>> In any case - explaining how nestedhvm_enabled() could end up
>>>> returning a value different from hvm_svm_enabled() would help
>>>> my understanding.
>>> nestedhvm_enabled() returns true when 'nestedhvm=1' in the
>>> guest config file.
>>> hvm_svm_enabled() returns true when the hvm guest enabled SVM
>>> in EFER.
>> And the guest should certainly be disallowed to enable SVM in
>> EFER when nestedhvm was not 1 in the config file.
> That's correct. The guest should also never see SVM available via
> cpuid.
> Analogous same regarding VMX on Intel.

So Suravee, bottom line from this is: Replace the prior checks
instead of adding the new ones.


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