[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH net-next 2/2] xen-netback: avoid allocating variable size array on stack
On Tue, 2013-04-30 at 17:50 +0100, Wei Liu wrote: > Tune xen_netbk_count_requests to not touch working array beyond limit, so that > we can make working array size constant. Is this really correct when max_skb_slots > XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN? Seems like we would either overrun the array or drop frames which max_skb_slots suggests we should accept? If anything the array would need to be size by XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MAX which a) doesn't exist and b) would be worse than using max_skb_slots. I wouldn't be particularly averse to enforcing some sensible maximum on max_skb_slots. Other options: Handle batches of work in <max_skb_slots sized bundles, but that gets complex when you consider the case of an skb which crosses multiple such bundles. xen_netbk_get_requests() copes the tx req again into the pending_tx_info -- any way we can arrange for this to just happen right in the first place? Or perhaps it is time for each vif to allocate a page of its own to shadow the shared ring, and remove that field from pending_tx_info? (which isn't really a net increase in memory usage, but might simplify some things?) One comment on the existing implementation below... > Signed-off-by: Wei Liu <wei.liu2@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++----- > 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c > b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c > index c44772d..c6dc084 100644 > --- a/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c > +++ b/drivers/net/xen-netback/netback.c > @@ -934,11 +934,15 @@ static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif, > RING_IDX cons = vif->tx.req_cons; > int slots = 0; > int drop_err = 0; > + int keep_looping; > > if (!(first->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data)) > return 0; > > do { > + struct xen_netif_tx_request dropped_tx = { 0 }; > + int cross_page = 0; > + > if (slots >= work_to_do) { > netdev_err(vif->dev, > "Asked for %d slots but exceeds this > limit\n", > @@ -972,8 +976,12 @@ static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif, > drop_err = -E2BIG; > } > > - memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + slots), > - sizeof(*txp)); > + if (!drop_err) > + memcpy(txp, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + slots), > + sizeof(*txp)); > + else > + memcpy(&dropped_tx, RING_GET_REQUEST(&vif->tx, cons + > slots), > + sizeof(dropped_tx)); Can we avoid needing to replicate if (!drop_err) txp else &dropped_tx with a macro or some other trickery? e.g txp = &dropped_tx and then the check is only on the txp++? > > /* If the guest submitted a frame >= 64 KiB then > * first->size overflowed and following slots will > @@ -995,13 +1003,21 @@ static int netbk_count_requests(struct xenvif *vif, > first->size -= txp->size; > slots++; > > - if (unlikely((txp->offset + txp->size) > PAGE_SIZE)) { > + if (!drop_err) > + cross_page = (txp->offset + txp->size) > PAGE_SIZE; > + else > + cross_page = (dropped_tx.offset + dropped_tx.size) > > PAGE_SIZE; > + > + if (unlikely(cross_page)) { > netdev_err(vif->dev, "Cross page boundary, txp->offset: > %x, size: %u\n", > txp->offset, txp->size); > netbk_fatal_tx_err(vif); > return -EINVAL; > } > - } while ((txp++)->flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data); > + > + keep_looping = (!drop_err && (txp++)->flags & > XEN_NETTXF_more_data) || > + (dropped_tx.flags & XEN_NETTXF_more_data); > + } while (keep_looping); > > if (drop_err) { > netbk_tx_err(vif, first, cons + slots); > @@ -1408,7 +1424,7 @@ static unsigned xen_netbk_tx_build_gops(struct > xen_netbk *netbk) > !list_empty(&netbk->net_schedule_list)) { > struct xenvif *vif; > struct xen_netif_tx_request txreq; > - struct xen_netif_tx_request txfrags[max_skb_slots]; > + struct xen_netif_tx_request txfrags[XEN_NETIF_NR_SLOTS_MIN]; > struct page *page; > struct xen_netif_extra_info extras[XEN_NETIF_EXTRA_TYPE_MAX-1]; > u16 pending_idx; _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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