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Re: [Xen-devel] [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
- To: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
- From: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2013 11:53:02 -0700
- Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@xxxxxxxxx>, Alex Shi <alex.shi@xxxxxxxxx>, Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xxxxxxxx>, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>, Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Tinnes <jln@xxxxxxxxxx>, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>, Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@xxxxxxxxx>, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "x86@xxxxxxxxxx" <x86@xxxxxxxxxx>, LKML <linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@xxxxxxx>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>, Eric Northup <digitaleric@xxxxxxxxxx>, "kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Tue, 09 Apr 2013 18:53:21 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xen.org>
On Tue, Apr 9, 2013 at 11:50 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 04/09/2013 11:46 AM, Kees Cook wrote:
>>
>> Ah-ha! Yes, I see now when comparing the debug/kernel_page_tables
>> reports. It's just the High Kernel Mapping that we care about.
>> Addresses outside that range are less of a leak. Excellent, then GDT
>> may not be a problem. Whew.
>>
>
> It does beg the question if we need to randomize kmalloc... which could
> have issues by itself.
Agreed, but this should be a separate issue. As is the fact that GDT
is writable and a discoverable target.
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security
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