[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86: make IDT read-only
- To: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 15:48:21 -0700
- Cc: Alexander Duyck <alexander.h.duyck@xxxxxxxxx>, Alex Shi <alex.shi@xxxxxxxxx>, Jeremy Fitzhardinge <jeremy@xxxxxxxx>, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@xxxxxxxxxx>, Will Drewry <wad@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Tinnes <jln@xxxxxxxxxx>, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@xxxxxxxxxx>, Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@xxxxxxxxx>, Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, x86@xxxxxxxxxx, linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Steven Rostedt <rostedt@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Borislav Petkov <borislav.petkov@xxxxxxx>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>, Eric Northup <digitaleric@xxxxxxxxxx>, kernel-hardening@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, virtualization@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 22:51:30 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xen.org>
On 04/08/2013 03:43 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> This makes the IDT unconditionally read-only. This primarily removes
> the IDT from being a target for arbitrary memory write attacks. It has
> an added benefit of also not leaking (via the "sidt" instruction) the
> kernel base offset, if it has been relocated.
>
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
> Cc: Eric Northup <digitaleric@xxxxxxxxxx>
Also, tglx: does this interfere with your per-cpu IDT efforts?
-hpa
_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
