[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 13/18 V2]: PVH xen: introduce p2m_map_foreign
At 17:51 -0700 on 15 Mar (1363369869), Mukesh Rathor wrote: > In this patch, I introduce a new type p2m_map_foreign for pages that a > dom0 maps from foreign domains its creating. Also, add > set_foreign_p2m_entry() to map p2m_map_foreign type pages. Other misc changes > related to p2m. First of all, as Jan and Konrad have pointed out, there seems to be a lot of unrelated changes in here, which needs to be separated out. > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > index a2d1591..38ea9ec 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-ept.c > @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ static void ept_p2m_type_to_flags(ept_entry_t *entry, > p2m_type_t type, p2m_acces > entry->w = 0; > break; > case p2m_grant_map_rw: > + case p2m_map_foreign: > entry->r = entry->w = 1; > entry->x = 0; > break; > @@ -430,7 +431,7 @@ ept_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn, > mfn_t mfn, > } > > /* Track the highest gfn for which we have ever had a valid mapping */ > - if ( p2mt != p2m_invalid && > + if ( p2mt != p2m_invalid && p2mt != p2m_mmio_dm && > (gfn + (1UL << order) - 1 > p2m->max_mapped_pfn) ) > p2m->max_mapped_pfn = gfn + (1UL << order) - 1; Is this relevant to the p2m_map_foreign stuff? > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c > index 302b621..3f46418 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pt.c > @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ static unsigned long p2m_type_to_flags(p2m_type_t t, mfn_t > mfn) > case p2m_ram_rw: > return flags | P2M_BASE_FLAGS | _PAGE_RW; > case p2m_grant_map_rw: > + case p2m_map_foreign: > return flags | P2M_BASE_FLAGS | _PAGE_RW | _PAGE_NX_BIT; > case p2m_mmio_direct: > if ( !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn_x(mfn)) ) > @@ -429,7 +430,7 @@ p2m_set_entry(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long gfn, > mfn_t mfn, > } > > /* Track the highest gfn for which we have ever had a valid mapping */ > - if ( p2mt != p2m_invalid > + if ( p2mt != p2m_invalid && p2mt != p2m_mmio_dm Likewise. > && (gfn + (1UL << page_order) - 1 > p2m->max_mapped_pfn) ) > p2m->max_mapped_pfn = gfn + (1UL << page_order) - 1; > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c > index 4837de3..6888cf1 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c > @@ -523,7 +523,7 @@ p2m_remove_page(struct p2m_domain *p2m, unsigned long > gfn, unsigned long mfn, > for ( i = 0; i < (1UL << page_order); i++ ) > { > mfn_return = p2m->get_entry(p2m, gfn + i, &t, &a, 0, NULL); > - if ( !p2m_is_grant(t) && !p2m_is_shared(t) ) > + if ( !p2m_is_grant(t) && !p2m_is_shared(t) && !p2m_is_foreign(t) > ) > set_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn+i, INVALID_M2P_ENTRY); > ASSERT( !p2m_is_valid(t) || mfn + i == mfn_x(mfn_return) ); > } > @@ -754,7 +754,35 @@ void p2m_change_type_range(struct domain *d, > p2m_unlock(p2m); > } > > +/* Returns: True for success. 0 for failure */ > +int set_foreign_p2m_entry(struct domain *dp, unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn) > +{ > + int rc = 0; > + p2m_type_t ot; > + mfn_t omfn; > + struct p2m_domain *p2m = p2m_get_hostp2m(dp); > + > + if ( !paging_mode_translate(dp) ) > + return 0; > + > + omfn = get_gfn_query(dp, gfn, &ot); > + if (mfn_valid(omfn)) { > + gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, "Already mapped mfn %lx at gfn:%lx\n", > + mfn_x(omfn), gfn); > + set_gpfn_from_mfn(mfn_x(omfn), INVALID_M2P_ENTRY); That needs to be gated on 'ot' -- you should only be doing this for plain RAM owned by the caller. > + } > + put_gfn(dp, gfn); Also, this put_gfn is too early. Now there's a race where another CPU could populate that GFN again before your set_p2m_entry(). AFAICT once you've done that this function will look so similar to set_mmio_p2m_entry that they should be refactored to extract the common parts. > + P2M_DEBUG("set foreign %lx %lx\n", gfn, mfn_x(mfn)); > + p2m_lock(p2m); > + rc = set_p2m_entry(p2m, gfn, mfn, 0, p2m_map_foreign, > p2m->default_access); > + p2m_unlock(p2m); > + if ( rc == 0 ) > + gdprintk(XENLOG_ERR, > + "set_foreign_p2m_entry: set_p2m_entry failed! gfn:%lx > mfn=%08lx\n", > + gfn, mfn_x(get_gfn_query(dp, gfn, &ot))); > + return rc; > +} > @@ -510,6 +512,8 @@ p2m_type_t p2m_change_type(struct domain *d, unsigned > long gfn, > int set_mmio_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn); > int clear_mmio_p2m_entry(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn); > > +/* Set foreign mfn in the current guest's p2m table (for pvh dom0) */ > +int set_foreign_p2m_entry(struct domain *domp, unsigned long gfn, mfn_t mfn); I don't think it's specific to dom 0. Certainly it doesn't have any access controls in it. Cheers, Tim. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |