[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 3/18 V2]: PVH xen: create domctl_memory_mapping() function
At 17:26 -0700 on 15 Mar (1363368383), Mukesh Rathor wrote: > In this patch, XEN_DOMCTL_memory_mapping code is put into a function so > it can be shared later for PVH. There is no change in it's > functionality. > > Changes in V2: > - Remove PHYSDEVOP_map_iomem sub hypercall, and the code supporting it > as the IO region is mapped transparently now. > > Signed-off-by: Mukesh Rathor <mukesh.rathor@xxxxxxxxxx> > --- > xen/arch/x86/domctl.c | 119 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------- > xen/include/xen/domain.h | 2 + > 2 files changed, 65 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c > index 31937e0..ecc8240 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/domctl.c > @@ -46,6 +46,68 @@ static int gdbsx_guest_mem_io( > return (iop->remain ? -EFAULT : 0); > } > > +long domctl_memory_mapping(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, > + unsigned long mfn, unsigned long nr_mfns, > + int add_map) > +{ > + int i; The loop variable at the source was 'unsigned long', and the loop limit is an unsigned long, so 'int' doesn't seem right. > @@ -628,68 +690,13 @@ long arch_do_domctl( > unsigned long mfn = domctl->u.memory_mapping.first_mfn; > unsigned long nr_mfns = domctl->u.memory_mapping.nr_mfns; > int add = domctl->u.memory_mapping.add_mapping; > - unsigned long i; > - > - ret = -EINVAL; > - if ( (mfn + nr_mfns - 1) < mfn || /* wrap? */ > - ((mfn | (mfn + nr_mfns - 1)) >> (paddr_bits - PAGE_SHIFT)) || > - (gfn + nr_mfns - 1) < gfn ) /* wrap? */ > - break; > > ret = -EPERM; > if ( !IS_PRIV(current->domain) && > !iomem_access_permitted(current->domain, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - > 1) ) > break; Why is this privilege check not being moved along with the rest of it? Execially given that the two other IS_PRIV()s below are taken? Tim. > - ret = xsm_iomem_mapping(XSM_HOOK, d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1, add); > - if ( ret ) > - break; > - > - if ( add ) > - { > - printk(XENLOG_G_INFO > - "memory_map:add: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n", > - d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns); > - > - ret = iomem_permit_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > - if ( !ret && paging_mode_translate(d) ) > - { > - for ( i = 0; !ret && i < nr_mfns; i++ ) > - if ( !set_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i, _mfn(mfn + i)) ) > - ret = -EIO; > - if ( ret ) > - { > - printk(XENLOG_G_WARNING > - "memory_map:fail: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx\n", > - d->domain_id, gfn + i, mfn + i); > - while ( i-- ) > - clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i); > - if ( iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1) && > - IS_PRIV(current->domain) ) > - printk(XENLOG_ERR > - "memory_map: failed to deny dom%d access to > [%lx,%lx]\n", > - d->domain_id, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > - } > - } > - } > - else > - { > - printk(XENLOG_G_INFO > - "memory_map:remove: dom%d gfn=%lx mfn=%lx nr=%lx\n", > - d->domain_id, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns); > - > - if ( paging_mode_translate(d) ) > - for ( i = 0; i < nr_mfns; i++ ) > - add |= !clear_mmio_p2m_entry(d, gfn + i); > - ret = iomem_deny_access(d, mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > - if ( !ret && add ) > - ret = -EIO; > - if ( ret && IS_PRIV(current->domain) ) > - printk(XENLOG_ERR > - "memory_map: error %ld %s dom%d access to > [%lx,%lx]\n", > - ret, add ? "removing" : "denying", d->domain_id, > - mfn, mfn + nr_mfns - 1); > - } > + ret = domctl_memory_mapping(d, gfn, mfn, nr_mfns, add); > } > break; > > diff --git a/xen/include/xen/domain.h b/xen/include/xen/domain.h > index d4ac50f..a7b4c34 100644 > --- a/xen/include/xen/domain.h > +++ b/xen/include/xen/domain.h > @@ -86,4 +86,6 @@ extern unsigned int xen_processor_pmbits; > > extern bool_t opt_dom0_vcpus_pin; > > +extern long domctl_memory_mapping(struct domain *d, unsigned long gfn, > + unsigned long mfn, unsigned long nr_mfns, int add_map); > #endif /* __XEN_DOMAIN_H__ */ > -- > 1.7.2.3 > > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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