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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [xen-4.1-testing test] 17235: trouble: broken/fail/pass
flight 17235 xen-4.1-testing real [real] http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs/17235/ Failures and problems with tests :-( Tests which did not succeed and are blocking, including tests which could not be run: test-amd64-i386-pv 3 host-install(3) broken REGR. vs. 17208 Tests which did not succeed, but are not blocking: build-armhf 4 xen-build fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel 9 guest-start fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-i386-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 16 leak-check/check fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 13 guest-stop fail never pass version targeted for testing: xen b56fe0b46f98afe918455bae193d543d3ffc4598 baseline version: xen ab01d96364683bb10619b794611b9244ba5ea227 ------------------------------------------------------------ People who touched revisions under test: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> ------------------------------------------------------------ jobs: build-amd64 pass build-armhf fail build-i386 pass build-amd64-oldkern pass build-i386-oldkern pass build-amd64-pvops pass build-i386-pvops pass test-amd64-amd64-xl pass test-amd64-i386-xl pass test-i386-i386-xl pass test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-amd pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-win7-amd64 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-credit2 pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-pcipt-intel fail test-amd64-i386-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemut-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-qemuu-rhel6hvm-intel pass test-amd64-i386-xl-multivcpu pass test-amd64-amd64-pair pass test-amd64-i386-pair pass test-i386-i386-pair pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf-pin pass test-amd64-amd64-pv pass test-amd64-i386-pv broken test-i386-i386-pv pass test-amd64-amd64-xl-sedf pass test-amd64-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xl-winxpsp3-vcpus1 fail test-amd64-i386-xend-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-i386-i386-xl-qemut-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail test-i386-i386-xl-qemuu-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-i386-xend-winxpsp3 fail test-amd64-amd64-xl-winxpsp3 fail test-i386-i386-xl-winxpsp3 fail ------------------------------------------------------------ sg-report-flight on woking.cam.xci-test.com logs: /home/xc_osstest/logs images: /home/xc_osstest/images Logs, config files, etc. are available at http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~xensrcts/logs Test harness code can be found at http://xenbits.xensource.com/gitweb?p=osstest.git;a=summary Not pushing. ------------------------------------------------------------ commit b56fe0b46f98afe918455bae193d543d3ffc4598 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Mar 12 16:46:09 2013 +0100 x86/MSI: add mechanism to fully protect MSI-X table from PV guest accesses This adds two new physdev operations for Dom0 to invoke when resource allocation for devices is known to be complete, so that the hypervisor can arrange for the respective MMIO ranges to be marked read-only before an eventual guest getting such a device assigned even gets started, such that it won't be able to set up writable mappings for these MMIO ranges before Xen has a chance to protect them. This also addresses another issue with the code being modified here, in that so far write protection for the address ranges in question got set up only once during the lifetime of a device (i.e. until either system shutdown or device hot removal), while teardown happened when the last interrupt was disposed of by the guest (which at least allowed the tables to be writable when the device got assigned to a second guest [instance] after the first terminated). Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master changeset: 4245d331e0e75de8d1bddbbb518f3a8ce6d0bb7e master date: 2013-03-08 14:05:34 +0100 commit 672c075ab39e2dea517a75d5e6091e6df82c3f71 Author: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Mar 12 16:30:41 2013 +0100 credit1: Use atomic bit operations for the flags structure The flags structure is not protected by locks (or more precisely, it is protected using an inconsistent set of locks); we therefore need to make sure that all accesses are atomic-safe. This is particulary important in the case of the PARKED flag, which if clobbered while changing the YIELD bit will leave a vcpu wedged in an offline state. Using the atomic bitops also requires us to change the size of the "flags" element. Spotted-by: Igor Pavlikevich <ipavlikevich@xxxxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> master changeset: be6507509454adf3bb5a50b9406c88504e996d5a master date: 2013-03-04 13:37:39 +0100 commit d8f9d5b8b98de7d035c5064fe99a44f0a383842f Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Mar 12 16:30:04 2013 +0100 x86: defer processing events on the NMI exit path Otherwise, we may end up in the scheduler, keeping NMIs masked for a possibly unbounded period of time (until whenever the next IRET gets executed). Enforce timely event processing by sending a self IPI. Of course it's open for discussion whether to always use the straight exit path from handle_ist_exception. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> master changeset: d463b005bbd6475ed930a302821efe239e1b2cf9 master date: 2013-03-04 10:19:34 +0100 commit 16c0caad7d44e80535d44c0690a691d22f74d378 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Mar 12 16:29:11 2013 +0100 SEDF: avoid gathering vCPU-s on pCPU0 The introduction of vcpu_force_reschedule() in 14320:215b799fa181 was incompatible with the SEDF scheduler: Any vCPU using VCPUOP_stop_periodic_timer (e.g. any vCPU of half way modern PV Linux guests) ends up on pCPU0 after that call. Obviously, running all PV guests' (and namely Dom0's) vCPU-s on pCPU0 causes problems for those guests rather sooner than later. So the main thing that was clearly wrong (and bogus from the beginning) was the use of cpumask_first() in sedf_pick_cpu(). It is being replaced by a construct that prefers to put back the vCPU on the pCPU that it got launched on. However, there's one more glitch: When reducing the affinity of a vCPU temporarily, and then widening it again to a set that includes the pCPU that the vCPU was last running on, the generic scheduler code would not force a migration of that vCPU, and hence it would forever stay on the pCPU it last ran on. Since that can again create a load imbalance, the SEDF scheduler wants a migration to happen regardless of it being apparently unnecessary. Of course, an alternative to checking for SEDF explicitly in vcpu_set_affinity() would be to introduce a flags field in struct scheduler, and have SEDF set a "always-migrate-on-affinity-change" flag. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> master changeset: e6a6fd63652814e5c36a0016c082032f798ced1f master date: 2013-03-04 10:17:52 +0100 commit 44e4100a138b2caf6a0947ad7ddef65c7678dbf3 Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Mar 12 16:24:58 2013 +0100 x86: make certain memory sub-ops return valid values When a domain's shared info field "max_pfn" is zero, domain_get_maximum_gpfn() so far returned ULONG_MAX, which do_memory_op() in turn converted to -1 (i.e. -EPERM). Make the former always return a sensible number (i.e. zero if the field was zero) and have the latter no longer truncate return values. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> master changeset: 7ffc9779aa5120c5098d938cb88f69a1dda9a0fe master date: 2013-03-04 10:16:04 +0100 commit 6b2f399604ba0d46203855658b72b9fcba76a7ac Author: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Mar 12 16:23:55 2013 +0100 fix compat memory exchange op splitting A shift with a negative count was erroneously used here, yielding undefined behavior. Reported-by: Xi Wang <xi@xxxxxxx> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Keir Fraser <keir@xxxxxxx> master changeset: 53decd322157e922cac2988e07da6d39538c8033 master date: 2013-03-01 16:59:49 +0100 commit 0ad719247a5072f3a1af6c77faf203e724acf2fd Author: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> Date: Tue Mar 12 16:23:15 2013 +0100 Avoid stale pointer when moving domain to another cpupool When a domain is moved to another cpupool the scheduler private data pointers in vcpu and domain structures must never point to an already freed memory area. While at it, simplify sched_init_vcpu() by using DOM2OP instead VCPU2OP. Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <juergen.gross@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx> This also required commit dbfa7bba0f213b1802e1900b71bc34837c30ee52: xen, cpupools: Fix cpupool-move to make more consistent The full order for creating new private data structures when moving from one pool to another is now: * Allocate all new structures - Allocate a new private domain structure (but don't point there yet) - Allocate per-vcpu data structures (but don't point there yet) * Remove old structures - Remove each vcpu, freeing the associated data structure - Free the domain data structure * Switch to the new structures - Set the domain to the new cpupool, with the new private domain structure - Set each vcpu to the respective new structure, and insert This is in line with a (fairly reasonable) assumption in credit2 that the private structure of the domain will be the private structure pointed to by the per-vcpu private structure. Also fix a bug, in which insert_vcpu was called with the *old* vcpu ops rather than the new ones. Signed-off-by: George Dunlap <george.dunlap@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> master changeset: 482300def7d08e773ccd2a0d978bcb9469fdd810 master date: 2013-02-28 14:56:45 +0000 commit 677c9126023e79cb8e0a74bc002bd7af06b53214 Author: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> Date: Tue Mar 12 16:22:03 2013 +0100 vmx: fix handling of NMI VMEXIT. Call do_nmi() directly and explicitly re-enable NMIs rather than raising an NMI through the APIC. Since NMIs are disabled after the VMEXIT, the raised NMI would be blocked until the next IRET instruction (i.e. the next real interrupt, or after scheduling a PV guest) and in the meantime the guest will spin taking NMI VMEXITS. Also, handle NMIs before re-enabling interrupts, since if we handle an interrupt (and therefore IRET) before calling do_nmi(), we may end up running the NMI handler with NMIs enabled. Signed-off-by: Tim Deegan <tim@xxxxxxx> Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> master changeset: 7dd3b06ff031c9a8c727df16c5def2afb382101c master date: 2013-02-28 14:00:18 +0000 (qemu changes not included) _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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