[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] IOMMU: don't disable bus mastering on faults for devices used by Xen or Dom0
On 05/11/2012 16:53, "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> wrote: > Under the assumption that in these cases recurring faults aren't a > security issue and it can be expected that the drivers there are going > to try to take care of the problem. > > Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> This one's sat a while with no comments... -- Keir > --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c > +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c > @@ -625,6 +625,18 @@ static void parse_event_log_entry(struct > for ( bdf = 0; bdf < ivrs_bdf_entries; bdf++ ) > if ( get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf) == device_id ) > { > + const struct pci_dev *pdev; > + > + spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock); > + pdev = pci_get_pdev(iommu->seg, PCI_BUS(bdf), > PCI_DEVFN2(bdf)); > + if ( pdev && pdev->domain != dom_xen && > + (!pdev->domain || !IS_PRIV(pdev->domain)) ) > + pdev = NULL; > + spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock); > + > + if ( pdev ) > + continue; > + > cword = pci_conf_read16(iommu->seg, PCI_BUS(bdf), > PCI_SLOT(bdf), PCI_FUNC(bdf), > PCI_COMMAND); > --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c > +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c > @@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ static void __do_iommu_page_fault(struct > reg = cap_fault_reg_offset(iommu->cap); > while (1) > { > - u8 fault_reason; > + const struct pci_dev *pdev; > + u8 fault_reason, bus; > u16 source_id, cword; > u32 data; > u64 guest_addr; > @@ -950,14 +951,27 @@ static void __do_iommu_page_fault(struct > iommu_page_fault_do_one(iommu, type, fault_reason, > source_id, guest_addr); > > - /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to > - * control it for us. */ > - cword = pci_conf_read16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, > - PCI_BUS(source_id), PCI_SLOT(source_id), > - PCI_FUNC(source_id), PCI_COMMAND); > - pci_conf_write16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, PCI_BUS(source_id), > - PCI_SLOT(source_id), PCI_FUNC(source_id), > - PCI_COMMAND, cword & ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER); > + bus = PCI_BUS(source_id); > + > + spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock); > + pdev = pci_get_pdev(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, bus, > + PCI_DEVFN2(source_id)); > + if ( pdev && pdev->domain != dom_xen && > + (!pdev->domain || !IS_PRIV(pdev->domain)) ) > + pdev = NULL; > + spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock); > + > + if ( !pdev ) > + { > + /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to > + * control it for us. */ > + cword = pci_conf_read16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, bus, > + PCI_SLOT(source_id), PCI_FUNC(source_id), > + PCI_COMMAND); > + pci_conf_write16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, bus, > + PCI_SLOT(source_id), PCI_FUNC(source_id), > + PCI_COMMAND, cword & ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER); > + } > > fault_index++; > if ( fault_index > cap_num_fault_regs(iommu->cap) ) > > > > _______________________________________________ > Xen-devel mailing list > Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx > http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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