[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] [PATCH] IOMMU: don't disable bus mastering on faults for devices used by Xen or Dom0
Under the assumption that in these cases recurring faults aren't a security issue and it can be expected that the drivers there are going to try to take care of the problem. Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx> --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/amd/iommu_init.c @@ -625,6 +625,18 @@ static void parse_event_log_entry(struct for ( bdf = 0; bdf < ivrs_bdf_entries; bdf++ ) if ( get_dma_requestor_id(iommu->seg, bdf) == device_id ) { + const struct pci_dev *pdev; + + spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock); + pdev = pci_get_pdev(iommu->seg, PCI_BUS(bdf), PCI_DEVFN2(bdf)); + if ( pdev && pdev->domain != dom_xen && + (!pdev->domain || !IS_PRIV(pdev->domain)) ) + pdev = NULL; + spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock); + + if ( pdev ) + continue; + cword = pci_conf_read16(iommu->seg, PCI_BUS(bdf), PCI_SLOT(bdf), PCI_FUNC(bdf), PCI_COMMAND); --- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c +++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c @@ -916,7 +916,8 @@ static void __do_iommu_page_fault(struct reg = cap_fault_reg_offset(iommu->cap); while (1) { - u8 fault_reason; + const struct pci_dev *pdev; + u8 fault_reason, bus; u16 source_id, cword; u32 data; u64 guest_addr; @@ -950,14 +951,27 @@ static void __do_iommu_page_fault(struct iommu_page_fault_do_one(iommu, type, fault_reason, source_id, guest_addr); - /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to - * control it for us. */ - cword = pci_conf_read16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, - PCI_BUS(source_id), PCI_SLOT(source_id), - PCI_FUNC(source_id), PCI_COMMAND); - pci_conf_write16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, PCI_BUS(source_id), - PCI_SLOT(source_id), PCI_FUNC(source_id), - PCI_COMMAND, cword & ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER); + bus = PCI_BUS(source_id); + + spin_lock(&pcidevs_lock); + pdev = pci_get_pdev(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, bus, + PCI_DEVFN2(source_id)); + if ( pdev && pdev->domain != dom_xen && + (!pdev->domain || !IS_PRIV(pdev->domain)) ) + pdev = NULL; + spin_unlock(&pcidevs_lock); + + if ( !pdev ) + { + /* Tell the device to stop DMAing; we can't rely on the guest to + * control it for us. */ + cword = pci_conf_read16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, bus, + PCI_SLOT(source_id), PCI_FUNC(source_id), + PCI_COMMAND); + pci_conf_write16(iommu->intel->drhd->segment, bus, + PCI_SLOT(source_id), PCI_FUNC(source_id), + PCI_COMMAND, cword & ~PCI_COMMAND_MASTER); + } fault_index++; if ( fault_index > cap_num_fault_regs(iommu->cap) ) Attachment:
IOMMU-disable-BM-not-dom0.patch _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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