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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH 19/22] arch/x86: check remote MMIO remap permissions
>>> On 13.09.12 at 15:46, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
> On 09/13/2012 04:00 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 12.09.12 at 17:59, Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
>>> When a domain is mapping pages from a different pg_owner domain, the
>>> iomem_access checks are currently only applied to the pg_owner domain,
>>> potentially allowing the current domain to bypass its more restrictive
>>> iomem_access policy using another domain that it has access to.
>>
>> Are you sure about this? I ask because ...
>>
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c
>>> @@ -754,6 +754,18 @@ get_page_from_l1e(
>>> return -EINVAL;
>>> }
>>>
>>> + if ( pg_owner != curr->domain &&
>>> + !iomem_access_permitted(curr->domain, mfn, mfn) )
>>> + {
>>> + if ( mfn != (PADDR_MASK >> PAGE_SHIFT) ) /* INVALID_MFN? */
>>> + {
>>> + MEM_LOG("Domain %u attempted to map I/O space %08lx in
> domain %u",
>>> + curr->domain->domain_id, mfn, pg_owner->domain_id);
>>> + return -EPERM;
>>> + }
>>> + return -EINVAL;
>>> + }
>>> +
>>
>> ... the place you insert this is after non-RAM pages got filtered
>> out already, so you're applying an IOMEM permission check to a
>> RAM page.
>>
>> Jan
>>
>>> if ( !(l1f & _PAGE_RW) ||
>>> !rangeset_contains_singleton(mmio_ro_ranges, mfn) )
>>> return 0;
>
> If that's true, then the check a few lines above is also applying IOMEM
> checks to RAM pages. I can see non-privileged attempts being filtered
> above,
I can't see how that would happen given this primary conditional
if ( !mfn_valid(mfn) ||
(real_pg_owner = page_get_owner_and_reference(page)) == dom_io )
Please clarify what you're observing.
> but successful mappings will continue to the check I added.
Of course. I would think that if anything, you would want to add
a second call to iomem_access_permitted() with "curr->domain"
right at the place where the current one is (in particular inside
the above quoted conditional).
Jan
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