[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH v2] Merge IS_PRIV checks into XSM hooks
On 10/09/2012 22:10, "Daniel De Graaf" <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: > On 09/10/2012 04:51 PM, Keir Fraser wrote: >> On 10/09/2012 20:48, "Daniel De Graaf" <dgdegra@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote: >> >>> Overall, this series should not change the behavior of Xen when XSM is >>> not enabled; however, in some cases, the exact errors that are returned >>> will be different because security checks have been moved below validity >>> checks. Also, once applied, newly introduced domctls and sysctls will >>> not automatically be guarded by IS_PRIV checks - they will need to add >>> their own permission checking code. >> >> How do we guard against accidentally forgetting to do this? > > The same way you guard against it when adding a new hypercall: when adding > new functionality that needs access checks, also add the access checks. So... We just shouldn't accidentally forget. That will work well. ;) Historically XSM has not been top of many committers' checklists. -- Keir >>> The ARM architecture is not touched at all in these patches. The only >>> obvious breakage that I can see is due to rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id >>> being removed, but XSM hooks will be needed for domctls and sysctls. >> >> So ARM build is broken? And/or ARM is made insecure because of unchecked >> sysctls/domctls? >> >> -- Keir > > The ARM build is broken by patch #19 in this series; fixing it is fairly > simple (I'll send a non-compile-tested version as 21/20), or you could > postpone that patch as it's just cleanup. > > Since ARM doesn't have any arch-specific domctls or sysctls yet, they are > not insecure. You could also add an IS_PRIV check at the top of ARM's > arch_do_{dom,sys}ctl functions if you don't want to add XSM hooks for each > operation as in x86. > >> >>> The rcu_lock_target_domain_by_id and rcu_lock_remote_target_domain_by_id >>> functions are removed by this series because they act as wrappers around >>> IS_PRIV_FOR; their callers have been changed to use XSM checks instead. >>> >>> Miscellaneous updates to FLASK: >>> [PATCH 01/20] xsm/flask: remove inherited class attributes >>> [PATCH 02/20] xsm/flask: remove unneeded create_sid field >>> [PATCH 03/20] xen: Add versions of rcu_lock_*_domain without IS_PRIV >>> [PATCH 04/20] xsm/flask: add domain relabel support >>> [PATCH 05/20] libxl: introduce XSM relabel on build >>> [PATCH 06/20] flask/policy: Add domain relabel example >>> >>> Preparatory new hooks: >>> [PATCH 07/20] arch/x86: add distinct XSM hooks for map/unmap >>> [PATCH 08/20] arch/x86: add missing XSM checks to XENPF_ commands >>> [PATCH 09/20] xsm/flask: Add checks on the domain performing the >>> >>> Refactoring: >>> [PATCH 10/20] xsm: Add IS_PRIV checks to dummy XSM module >>> [PATCH 11/20] xen: use XSM instead of IS_PRIV where duplicated >>> [PATCH 12/20] xen: avoid calling rcu_lock_*target_domain when an XSM >>> >>> Remaining IS_PRIV calls: >>> [PATCH 13/20] arch/x86: Add missing domctl and mem_sharing XSM hooks >>> [PATCH 14/20] tmem: Add access control check >>> [PATCH 17/20] arch/x86: use XSM hooks for get_pg_owner access checks >>> [PATCH 18/20] xen: Add XSM hook for XENMEM_exchange >>> >>> Cleanup, FLASK updates to support IS_PRIV emulation: >>> [PATCH 15/20] xsm: remove unneeded xsm_call macro >>> [PATCH 16/20] xsm/flask: add distinct SIDs for self/target access >>> [PATCH 19/20] xen: remove rcu_lock_{remote_,}target_domain_by_id >>> [PATCH 20/20] flask: add missing operations >>> _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-devel
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