[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Re: [PATCH] Don't allow sharing of tx skbs on xen-netfront
On Fri, 2011-11-18 at 11:48 +0000, Neil Horman wrote: > On Fri, Nov 18, 2011 at 10:30:13AM +0000, Ian Campbell wrote: > > On Thu, 2011-11-17 at 20:45 +0000, Neil Horman wrote: > > > On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 08:17:01PM +0000, Ian Campbell wrote: > > > > On Thu, 2011-11-17 at 19:25 +0000, Neil Horman wrote: > > > > > On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 03:20:38PM +0000, Ian Campbell wrote: > > > > > > On Mon, 2011-11-14 at 14:22 -0500, Neil Horman wrote: > > > > > > > It was pointed out to me recently that the xen-netfront driver > > > > > > > can't safely > > > > > > > support shared skbs on transmit, since, while it doesn't maintain > > > > > > > skb state > > > > > > > directly, it does pass a pointer to the skb to the hypervisor via > > > > > > > a list, and > > > > > > > the hypervisor may expect the contents of the skb to remain > > > > > > > stable. Clearing > > > > > > > the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag after the call to alloc_etherdev to > > > > > > > make it safe. > > > > > > > > > > > > What are the actual constraints here? The skb is used as a handle > > > > > > to the > > > > > > skb->data and shinfo (frags) and to complete at the end. It's > > > > > > actually > > > > > > those which are passed to the hypervisor (effectively the same as > > > > > > passing those addresses to the h/w for DMA). > > > > > > > > > > > > Which parts of the skb are expected/allowed to not remain stable? > > > > > > > > > > > > (Appologies if the above seems naive, I seem to have missed the > > > > > > introduction of shared tx skbs and IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING) > > > > > > > > > > > Its ok, this is the most accurate description from the previous > > > > > threads on the > > > > > subject: > > > > > 2 > > > > > > > > > > The basic problem boils down the notion that some drivers, when they > > > > > receive an > > > > > skb in their xmit paths, presume to have sole ownership of the skb, > > > > > and as a > > > > > result may do things like add the skb to a list, or otherwise store > > > > > stateful > > > > > data in the skb. If the skb is shared, thats unsafe to do, as the > > > > > stack still > > > > > holds a reference to the skb, and make make changes without > > > > > serializing them > > > > > against the driver. So we have to flag those drivers which preform > > > > > these kinds > > > > > of actions. xen-netfront doesn't strictly speaking modify any state > > > > > directly ni > > > > > an skb, but it does place a pointer to the skb in a data structure > > > > > here: > > > > > > > > > > np->tx_skbs[id].skb = skb; > > > > > > > > > > Which then gets handed off to the hypervisior. Since the hypervisor > > > > > now has > > > > > access to that skb pointer, and we can't be sure (from the guest > > > > > perspective), > > > > > what it does with that information, it would be better to be safe by > > > > > disallowing > > > > > shared skbs in this path. > > > > > > > > The skb pointer itself doesn't get given to the backend/hypervisor. The > > > > page which skb->data refers to is granted to the backend domain, as are > > > > the pages in the frags. > > > > > > > > I think we only need to be sure that the frontend doesn't rely on > > > > anything in the skb itself, right? Does skb->data or shinfo count from > > > > that perspective? > > > shinfo is definately a problem, as other devices may make modifications > > > to it. > > > skb->data is probably safer, but is also potentially suspect (for > > > instance if > > > another device appends an additional header to the data for instance) > > > > A device is allowed to rely on these things being stable while in its > > start_xmit, right? (otherwise I don't see how any device can ever > > cope...). > > > While the start_xmit routine is executing, yes. Its only after the driver > returns, that it can have no expectation of an skb's data to remain stable. > > > netfront only uses shinfo and ->data during start_xmit in order to > > create the necessary grant reference (which can be thought of as a DMA > > address passed to the virtual hardware). The only use of the stashed skb > > pointer outside of this are to dev_kfree_skb on tx completion (from > > either tx_buf_gc (normal completion) or release_tx_buf ("hardware" > > reset). > > > Ok, if you're certain you can guarantee that the hypervisior makes no > inspection > of the skb after the return from the driver, then you're safe I believe this is the case, all that is exposed to the backend is the pfn, offset and length of the skb->data and frags at the time start_xmit was called. > Neil > > > Ian. > > > > _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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