[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-devel] Re: [PATCH] Don't allow sharing of tx skbs on xen-netfront
On Thu, 2011-11-17 at 20:45 +0000, Neil Horman wrote: > On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 08:17:01PM +0000, Ian Campbell wrote: > > On Thu, 2011-11-17 at 19:25 +0000, Neil Horman wrote: > > > On Thu, Nov 17, 2011 at 03:20:38PM +0000, Ian Campbell wrote: > > > > On Mon, 2011-11-14 at 14:22 -0500, Neil Horman wrote: > > > > > It was pointed out to me recently that the xen-netfront driver can't > > > > > safely > > > > > support shared skbs on transmit, since, while it doesn't maintain skb > > > > > state > > > > > directly, it does pass a pointer to the skb to the hypervisor via a > > > > > list, and > > > > > the hypervisor may expect the contents of the skb to remain stable. > > > > > Clearing > > > > > the IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING flag after the call to alloc_etherdev to make > > > > > it safe. > > > > > > > > What are the actual constraints here? The skb is used as a handle to the > > > > skb->data and shinfo (frags) and to complete at the end. It's actually > > > > those which are passed to the hypervisor (effectively the same as > > > > passing those addresses to the h/w for DMA). > > > > > > > > Which parts of the skb are expected/allowed to not remain stable? > > > > > > > > (Appologies if the above seems naive, I seem to have missed the > > > > introduction of shared tx skbs and IFF_TX_SKB_SHARING) > > > > > > > Its ok, this is the most accurate description from the previous threads > > > on the > > > subject: > > > 2 > > > > > > The basic problem boils down the notion that some drivers, when they > > > receive an > > > skb in their xmit paths, presume to have sole ownership of the skb, and > > > as a > > > result may do things like add the skb to a list, or otherwise store > > > stateful > > > data in the skb. If the skb is shared, thats unsafe to do, as the stack > > > still > > > holds a reference to the skb, and make make changes without serializing > > > them > > > against the driver. So we have to flag those drivers which preform these > > > kinds > > > of actions. xen-netfront doesn't strictly speaking modify any state > > > directly ni > > > an skb, but it does place a pointer to the skb in a data structure here: > > > > > > np->tx_skbs[id].skb = skb; > > > > > > Which then gets handed off to the hypervisior. Since the hypervisor now > > > has > > > access to that skb pointer, and we can't be sure (from the guest > > > perspective), > > > what it does with that information, it would be better to be safe by > > > disallowing > > > shared skbs in this path. > > > > The skb pointer itself doesn't get given to the backend/hypervisor. The > > page which skb->data refers to is granted to the backend domain, as are > > the pages in the frags. > > > > I think we only need to be sure that the frontend doesn't rely on > > anything in the skb itself, right? Does skb->data or shinfo count from > > that perspective? > shinfo is definately a problem, as other devices may make modifications to it. > skb->data is probably safer, but is also potentially suspect (for instance if > another device appends an additional header to the data for instance) A device is allowed to rely on these things being stable while in its start_xmit, right? (otherwise I don't see how any device can ever cope...). netfront only uses shinfo and ->data during start_xmit in order to create the necessary grant reference (which can be thought of as a DMA address passed to the virtual hardware). The only use of the stashed skb pointer outside of this are to dev_kfree_skb on tx completion (from either tx_buf_gc (normal completion) or release_tx_buf ("hardware" reset). Ian. _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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