[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] RE: [Xen-devel] Weekly VMX status report. Xen: #18846 & Xen0: #749
On 12/13/2008 6:06:18 AM, Keir Fraser wrote: > On 12/12/2008 23:30, "Gianluca Guida" <gianluca.guida@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> > wrote: > > > Keir Fraser wrote: > > > Is there any guest that actually cares about having EFER_NX really > > > cleared? Presumably the only way of detecting this would be > > > reserved-bit page faults, which no OS is likely to want to > > > deliberately cause? > > > > Yes, no OS we've actually experienced at the moment rely on reserved > > bit faults (with the most notable exception of Tim's fast path for > > MMIO and non present pages in Xen's shadow entries). > > I am sure about this for a very simple reason: -- some kind of > > secret I would like to share with you and xen-devel -- shadow code > > doesn't check at all for reserved bits when propagating changes from > > guest to shadows, so we never propagate reserved bit faults to > > guests. [working on this] > > Well, I vote for leaving EFER_NX always on then. It makes the code > simpler too. Anyone against this? Agree. Modern VMX-capable processors can save/restore Guest/Host IA32_EFER in the VMCS at VM exit/entry time, and I don't expect additional overheads from that. So the options are: 1. Enable that feature (does not help old processors, though), or 2. If the guest does not enable NX but the processor does, set/reset NX at VM entry/exit. We are already handling other bits (e.g. SCE). Thanks, . Jun Nakajima | Intel Open Source Technology Center _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel
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