[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [Xen-users] Xen Security Advisory 25 (CVE-2012-4544) - Xen domain builder Out-of-memory due to malicious kernel/ramdisk
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Xen Security Advisory CVE-2012-4544 / XSA-25 Xen domain builder Out-of-memory due to malicious kernel/ramdisk ISSUE DESCRIPTION ================= The Xen PV domain builder contained no validation of the size of the supplied kernel or ramdisk either before or after decompression. This could cause the toolstack to consume all available RAM in the domain running the domain builder. IMPACT ====== A malicious guest administrator who can supply a kernel or ramdisk can exhaust memory in domain 0 leading to a denial of service attack. VULNERABLE SYSTEMS ================== All versions of Xen are vulnerable. MITIGATION ========== Running only trusted kernels and ramdisks will avoid this vulnerability. Using pvgrub also avoids this vulnerability since the builder will run in guest context. (nb: use of pygrub *is* vulnerable). Running only HVM guests will avoid this vulnerability. RELATED ISSUE ============= CVE-2012-2625 covers a bug in pygrub which caused that process to consume excessive amount of memory under similar circumstances to the above. This was fixed in xen-unstable (and the fix inherited by Xen 4.2.x) in revision 25589:60f09d1ab1fe but not called out as a security problem. This fix is also included, where relevant, in the patches below. RESOLUTION ========== Applying the appropriate attached patch resolves this issue, including the related pygrub fix where neccesary. xsa25-unstable.patch Xen unstable xsa25-4.2.patch Xen 4.2.x xsa25-4.1.patch Xen 4.1.x $ sha256sum xsa25*.patch 613e4b82cdc9cabf9cbd52076118887b298c47e680c2066a28a77f12e9f90606 xsa25-4.1.patch 135bc089d003f9b97991764c37b1ab8d37e9cbcfa1b9bd7429b4503abe00c8f5 xsa25-4.2.patch 534495b7eef6e599f5814f0a67fc84fbe2e8eee9d223a09ad178ff63bdcda3dd xsa25-unstable.patch Note that these patches impose a new size limit of 1Gby on both the compressed and uncompressed sizes of ramdisks. On some systems it may be desirable to relax these limits and risk virtual address or memory exhaustion in the toolstack. This can be achieved by setting XC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX to the desired limit (in bytes). This can be done by building with "APPEND_CFLAGS=-DXC_DOM_DECOMPRESS_MAX=<limit>" or by editing tools/libxc/xc_dom.h directly. NOTE REGARDING LACK OF EMBARGO ============================== These issues have already been discussed in public in various places, including https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2012-2625 and http://bugs.debian.org/688125. This advisory is therefore not subject to an embargo. -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iQEcBAEBAgAGBQJQim1nAAoJEIP+FMlX6CvZgw0IAKTyGbRlt5N2i8YbRdAj0+wF OA4X5G1GlAEf0iGVjYi92/HnVyjWxLSNCKJK4YSWAUrlnkAC2IEUU6vqQOkxN/ic 88D1VS8tEtQwRGa9jNxf4RTCLvdGxrVK4lnSDu7OplgwMDT7O/X+Dq89xKN2VCYw /iqpzlAndmC0Lqz0U8VlV71JryS5uwg980GWimQaIEinyOWFS5cuImvBamptl+zU aoU3JxERd3YWASrspm8dBOtwc75DucWY1hOjz52uloodKcJha55Objcm8dn76xwN JV7sHGFRrQyxHnQJ9GeSuV0RHkxB6VhMXTGWKFaynOLjtUUoidkawgs1ld+Qsms= =Vj6Q -----END PGP SIGNATURE----- Attachment:
xsa25-4.1.patch Attachment:
xsa25-4.2.patch Attachment:
xsa25-unstable.patch _______________________________________________ Xen-users mailing list Xen-users@xxxxxxxxxxxxx http://lists.xen.org/xen-users
|
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |