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RE: [Xen-ia64-devel] PATCH: cleanup of tlbflush



>From: Tristan Gingold [mailto:Tristan.Gingold@xxxxxxxx]
>Sent: 2006年5月11日 17:06
>>
>> No one talks about trusting domU. I'm not digging into xen/x86's code
>> to see how they prevent such malicious behavior by passing an
>incorrect
>> virtual address at domain unmap request. Maybe the solution is there,
>> maybe not. Anyway it's a common security issue, not specific to ia64.
>No, it is specific to ia64, because x86 purges the tlb.
>Our main problem is purge time: it is a simple instruction on x86
>(reloading
>cr3, maybe through IPI), while a lot of works on ia64.
>

No, it's common. Xen/x86 also relies on passed gva to purge entries 
in writable page table. If domain deliberately passes an incorrect hva 
related to granted entry, xen/x86 will also populate incorrect pte entry. 
Later even after tlb is purged, domain is still possible to access ungranted 
pages since stale entry is still in pgtable.

That's why I say flush_tlb_mask should really flush TLB only. Software 
structure (vhpt for ia64, writable pgtable for x86) is manipulated earlier 
by __gnttab_unmap_grant_ref where above security issue may apply.

Thanks,
Kevin

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