RE: [Xen-ia64-devel] [PATCH] fully virtualize psr and ipsr onnon-VTIdomain

["Xu, Anthony" <anthony.xu@xxxxxxxxx>]

Understand :-)

Thanks,
-Anthony 

>-----Original Message-----
>From: Shuji Kurihara [mailto:kurihara@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx]
>Sent: 2006?3?31? 12:25
>To: Xu, Anthony; Magenheimer, Dan HP Labs Fort Collins
>Cc: xen-ia64-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>Subject: RE: [Xen-ia64-devel] [PATCH] fully virtualize psr and ipsr
>onnon-VTIdomain
>
>
>Hi Anthony.
>
>Xu, Anthony wrote:
>>Hi Shuji,
>>Welcome to community!
>>Not quite understand the issue.
>>Is the panic related to gcc segmentation fault?
>>Has you applied vcpu_translate patch?
>>
>
>The panic is not related to gcc segmentation fault.
>But with itc instruction.
>
>Tha panic was caused by itc instruction which is fixed when
>vcpu_translate patch is applied.
>
>Below is test environment and results:
>
>  - CSet#8167 + psr.patch
>     Both panic and gcc segmentation fault
>
>  - CSet#8167 + psr.patch + vcpu_translate.patch
>     Only gcc segmentation fault
>
>  - CSet#9395 + psr.patch
>     Only gcc segmentation fault
>
>Thanks,
>Shuji
>
>>
>>
>>Thanks,
>>-Anthony
>>
>>>-----Original Message-----
>>>From: xen-ia64-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>[mailto:xen-ia64-devel-bounces@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx] On Behalf Of Shuji
>>>Kurihara
>>>Sent: 2006?3?30? 22:35
>>>To: Magenheimer, Dan (HP Labs Fort Collins)
>>>Cc: xen-ia64-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>Subject: RE: [Xen-ia64-devel] [PATCH] fully virtualize psr and ipsr
>>>onnon-VTIdomain
>>>
>>>
>>>Hi Dan,
>>>
>>>Some time ago, you reported that the fully virtualize psr and ipsr patch
>>>by Anthony caused Linux compilation to crash the system.
>>>This panic seems to be solved by applying the vcpu_translate_patch.
>>>However, the original gcc segmentation fault problem still occurs on
>>>this system, and it still remains to be solved.  Details below.
>>>
>>>  psr.patch:
>>>
>>>http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-ia64-devel/2005-11/msg00312.
>ht
>>>ml
>>>
>>>  vcpu_tranalate.patch:
>>>
>>>http://lists.xensource.com/archives/html/xen-ia64-devel/2006-03/msg00328.
>ht
>>>ml
>>>
>>>The panic occurs when trying to handle a tlb miss following "itc"
>>>instruction.  Below is console output:
>>>
>>>(XEN) vcpu_translate: bad physical address: a00000010000a090
>>>(XEN) translate_domain_pte: bad mpa=000000010000a090 (> 0000000018000000),
>>>vadr=a00000010000a090,pteval=001000010000a761,itir=0000000000000038
>>>(XEN) lookup_domain_mpa: bad mpa 000000010000a090 (> 0000000018000000
>>>(XEN) handle_op: can't handle privop at 0xa00000010000a090
>>>(op=0x000001a7a7a7a7a7)
>>> slot 0 (type=5), ipsr=0000101208026010
>>>(XEN) priv_emulate: priv_handle_op fails, isr=0000000000000000
>>>(XEN) $$$$$ PANIC in domain 1 (k6=f000000007f98000): psr.dt off,
>>>trying to deliver nested dtlb!
>>>(XEN)
>>>(XEN) CPU 0
>>>(XEN) psr : 0000101208026010 ifs : 800000000000040e ip  :
>[<a00000010000a090>]
>>>(XEN) ip is at ???
>>>(XEN) unat: 0000000000000000 pfs : c00000000000040e rsc : 000000000000000f
>>>(XEN) rnat: 0000000000000000 bsps: 60000fff7fffc160 pr  : 000000000555a261
>>>(XEN) ldrs: 0000000000700000 ccv : 0010000001c585a1 fpsr: 0009804c8a70033f
>>>(XEN) csd : 0000000000000000 ssd : 0000000000000000
>>>(XEN) b0  : a00000010000a070 b6  : 20000000001f8780 b7  : 0000000000000000
>>>(XEN) f6  : 000000000000000000000 f7  : 000000000000000000000
>>>(XEN) f8  : 000000000000000000000 f9  : 000000000000000000000
>>>(XEN) f10 : 000000000000000000000 f11 : 000000000000000000000
>>>(XEN) r1  : 60000000000021f0 r2  : 0000000000000000 r3  : 0000000000000308
>>>(XEN) r8  : 0000000000000000 r9  : 20000000002c64a0 r10 : 0000000000000000
>>>(XEN) r11 : c00000000000040e r12 : 60000fffffaa7610 r13 : 20000000002d06a0
>>>(XEN) r14 : 0000000000000030 r15 : 6000000000100000 r16 : 6000000000100000
>>>(XEN) r17 : 0000000001bf4200 r18 : 0010000001c585a1 r19 : 0001800000000040
>>>(XEN) r20 : 000000001613c000 r21 : 0000000000000000 r22 : 5fffff0000000000
>>>(XEN) r23 : 000000001613c000 r24 : 0000000000000038 r25 : 0010000001c585e1
>>>(XEN) r26 : 0010000001c585a1 r27 : 0000000000000038 r28 : 0000000000000000
>>>(XEN) r29 : 4000000000001870 r30 : a00000010000a070 r31 : 000000000555a2a1
>>>(XEN) vcpu_translate: bad physical address: 60000fff7fffc1d0
>>>(XEN) translate_domain_pte: bad mpa=00000fff7fffc1d0 (> 0000000018000000),
>>>vadr=60000fff7fffc1d0,pteval=00100fff7fffc761,itir=0000000000000038
>>>(XEN) lookup_domain_mpa: bad mpa 00000fff7fffc1d0 (> 0000000018000000
>>>(XEN) r32 : f0000000f0000000 r33 : f0000000f0000000 r34 : f0000000f0000000
>>>(XEN) r35 : f0000000f0000000 r36 : f0000000f0000000 r37 : f4f4f4f4f4f4f4f4
>>>(XEN) r38 : f4f4f4f4f4f4f4f4 r39 : f4f4f4f4f4f4f4f4 r40 : f4f4f4f4f4f4f4f4
>>>(XEN) r41 : f4f4f4f4f4f4f4f4 r42 : f4f4f4f4f4f4f4f4 r43 : f4f4f4f4f4f4f4f4
>>>(XEN) r44 : f4f4f4f4f4f4f4f4 r45 : f4f4f4f4f4f4f4f4
>>>(XEN) BUG at domain.c:339
>>>(XEN) bad hyperprivop; ignored
>>>(XEN) iim=0, iip=f0000000040203d0
>>>(XEN) bad hyperprivop; ignored
>>>(XEN) iim=0, iip=f0000000040203d0
>>>
>>>One of the above messages:
>>>
>>>  (XEN) vcpu_translate: bad physical address: a00000010000a090
>>>
>>>The address "a00000010000a090" points to the instruction below.
>>>
>>>  a00000010000a090:  cb 00 64 00 2e 04  [MMI] (p06) itc.d r25;;
>>>
>>>When the VMM tries to get the opcode to call priv_handle_op(),
>>>it seems to trigger a tlb miss, and causes domU to hang.
>>>It seems from the message that domain is in metaphysical mode
>>>after executing "rsm psr.dt" instruction, and the fault address is
>>>in region 5.
>>>
>>>This situation is similar to the problem vcpu_translate_patch
>>>tries to solve.  The patch fixes vcpu_translate() so that
>>>the guest OS does not operate in metaphysical mode in such a case.
>>>
>>>We have run the same test program on Xen 3.0-unstable with CSet#9395
>>>(which includes vcpu_translate patch) and it run throughout the weekend
>>>without causing any panic.  On the other hand, the original Xen without
>>>the patch crashes within 2 hours.  However, the original gcc
>>>segmentation faults still occured on the system, so neither CSet#8671
>>>nor #9395 seems to solve the original problem.
>>>
>>>Thanks,
>>>Shuji
>>>
>>>>Hi Anthony --
>>>>
>>>>Since things have stabilized, I decided to give this patch
>>>>some testing, primarily to see if it might fix the gcc
>>>>segmentation faults that Fujita and I have been seeing.
>>>>Without this patch, I am able to compile Linux 20 times
>>>>on domU; generally 1 or 2 of the compiles fails because
>>>>of the gcc segfault.  With the patch, Xen *crashed*
>>>>on the sixth Linux compile (first try) and halfway
>>>>through the first Linux compile (second try).  This
>>>>is on a Tiger4, but I currently am not able to get console
>>>>output so I don't have any information about the crash --
>>>>other than that the machine didn't reboot.  Could you see
>>>>if you could reproduce this?
>>>>
>>>>As an aside, turning off the FAST_BREAK, FAST_ACCESS_REFLECT,
>>>>and FAST_RFI features (which your patch turns off) slowed
>>>>down the benchmark by about 4%.
>>>>
>>>>Thanks,
>>>>Dan
>>>>
>>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>>> From: Xu, Anthony [mailto:anthony.xu@xxxxxxxxx]
>>>>> Sent: Sunday, November 27, 2005 8:22 PM
>>>>> To: Magenheimer, Dan (HP Labs Fort Collins)
>>>>> Cc: xen-ia64-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>>> Subject: [Xen-ia64-devel] [PATCH] fully virtualize psr and
>>>>> ipsr on non-VTI domain
>>>>>
>>>>> Dan,
>>>>> This patch is intended to fully virtualize psr and ipsr on non-VTI
>>>>> domain.
>>>>> Following things are done in this patch.
>>>>> 1, previously when guest reads psr, it always get psr dt rt
>>>>> it equal to
>>>>> 1. that is because HV doesn't restore these information,
>>>>> metaphysical_mode can't present all these information. I save these
>>>>> information into privregs->vpsr. Thus guest can get correct
>>>>> information
>>>>> about dt, rt and it.
>>>>> 2, when guest reads psr, we should only return low 32bits and
>>>>> 35 and 36
>>>>> bits, previously return all bits.
>>>>> 3, when guest rsm and ssm psr, HV rsm and ssm some bits of current psr
>>>>> which is used by HV, that is not correct, guest rsm and ssm
>>>>> should only
>>>>> impact guest psr(that is regs->ipsr).
>>>>> 4, mistakenly uses guest DCR, guest DCR should impact guest psr when
>>>>> injecting interruption into guest, but not impact guest ipsr.
>>>>> When injecting interruption into guest,The current implementation is
>>>>>       Guest ipsr.be=guest dcr.be
>>>>>       Guest ipsr.pp=guest dcr.pp
>>>>> Correct implementation should be,
>>>>>       Guest psr.be=guest dcr.be
>>>>>       Guest psr.pp=guest dcr.pp.
>>>>>
>>>>> Because of above modifications, I turn off FAST_RFI, FAST_BREAK and
>>>>> FAST_ACCESS_REFLECT.
>>>>>
>>>>> Signed-off-by Anthony Xu < anthony.xu@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>
>>>>> One question, why do we need to virtualize guest psr.pp and always set
>>>>> guest psr.pp to 1?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thanks
>>>>> -Anthony
>>>
>>>_______________________________________________
>>>Xen-ia64-devel mailing list
>>>Xen-ia64-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
>>>http://lists.xensource.com/xen-ia64-devel

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