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Re: [PATCH v3 08/39] xen/riscv: implement virtual APLIC MMIO emulation
- To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>, Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@xxxxxxxxxx>
- From: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2026 13:45:15 +0200
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- Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Romain Caritey <Romain.Caritey@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Zheng Zhang <zhangzheng@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>, Connor Davis <connojdavis@xxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Wed, 14 Oct 2026 11:45:30 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 10/14/26 8:16 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 13.10.2026 18:06, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
On 10/5/26 4:53 PM, Baptiste Le Duc wrote:
Guests running under Xen program interrupt routing by writing to APLIC
MMIO registers. Xen must intercept these accesses to enforce interrupt
isolation between domains and to translate guest routing intent into the
underlying physical MSI topology.
Register the vAPLIC range with the MMIO dispatch and emulate the accesses:
- reads and writes are masked with the domain's authorised interrupt
bitmap, so that a guest can neither observe nor affect interrupts it
does not own;
- target registers are shadowed per source, so that a guest reads back
what it wrote. The h/w register instead gets the hart index and guest
interrupt file of the pCPU the target vCPU's interrupt file lives on,
as the APLIC uses these fields directly to compute the MSI address. As
long as the target vCPU has no h/w guest interrupt file, only the
shadow copy is updated;
- only MSI delivery mode is emulated: target writes made while the
guest's domaincfg.DM is clear are ignored.
Delegation (APLIC_SOURCECFG_D) is not yet supported.
Co-developed-by: Romain Caritey <Romain.Caritey@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
Co-developed-by: needs a matching Signed-off-by: from Romain right after
it.
I will contact Romain and ask for his Signed-off-by.
Just to mention: Co-developed-by: can mean many things. We haven't been
insisting on matching S-o-b before. Plus if there was an S-o-b, why
would there want/need to be Co-developed-by: as well?
I haven't checked if it is true for Xen (my fault). I know that such
rule is in Linux
(https://docs.kernel.org/process/submitting-patches.html#when-to-use-acked-by-cc-and-co-developed-by):
...
Since Co-developed-by: denotes authorship, every Co-developed-by:
must be immediately followed by a Signed-off-by:
...
I've never thought in that way about S-o-b and I think I can agree with
that there is no point to have Co-developed-by if there is correspondent
S-o-b, i.e. S-o-b by default includes C-o-b.
~ Oleksii
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