|
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v2 1/6] xen/riscv: fix Svade/Svadu A/D bit handling
On 2026-09-21 17:26:47+02:00, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 10.09.2026 11:34, Baptiste Le Duc wrote: > > > p2m_set_permission() only presets the PTE A/D bits when the Svade extension > > is present in the device tree. This causes an unhandled page fault when > > neither Svade nor Svadu is present (the platform's actual behaviour is then > > unknown), and when both are present in the device tree. > > > > Move the Svade/Svadu resolution out of p2m_set_permission() and into a new > > riscv_resolve_ad_scheme(), called once from riscv_fill_hwcap(). For each of > > the four possible Svade/Svadu combinations (inspired by [1]), it decides > > whether software has to preset the A/D bits and, if so, sets > > RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade to record that decision: > > - neither present: assume Svade, since assuming Svade is harmless on real > > Svadu hardware, while assuming Svadu on real Svade hardware risks an > > unhandled page fault > > - only Svade present: assume Svade > > - only Svadu present: leave A/D management to hardware > > - both present: Svade wins until Xen supports the SBI FWFT call needed to > > enable hardware updating of A/D bits, so assume Svade and warn that > > dropping 'svade' from the DT is the only way to get Svadu. > > > > [1] https://lwn.net/Articles/980016/ > > > > Fixes: ff14053983b0 ("xen/riscv: Implement p2m_pte_from_mfn() and support > > PBMT configuration") > > Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 > > Signed-off-by: Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@xxxxxxxxxx> > > --- > > Changes since v1: > > - change commit title > > - expose RISCV_ISA_EXT_svadu so the two extensions can be told apart. > > - move the Svade/Svadu resolution to a new riscv_resolve_ad_scheme(), > > called once from riscv_fill_hwcap(). > > - expose sbi_probe_extension() (was static) to probe for SBI FWFT. > > - stop presetting A/D bits unconditionally in p2m_set_permission(), do it > > only when Svade is present. > > --- > > xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c | 59 > > +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > > xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 1 + > > xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/sbi.h | 8 +++++ > > xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c | 47 ++++++++++---------------- > > 4 files changed, 86 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c b/xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c > > index 92235fdfd5..19454544a7 100644 > > --- a/xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/cpufeature.c > > @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ > > > > #include <asm/cpufeature.h> > > #include <asm/csr.h> > > +#include <asm/sbi.h> > > > > #ifdef CONFIG_ACPI > > # error "cpufeature.c functions should be updated to support ACPI" > > @@ -468,6 +469,62 @@ static bool __init has_isa_extensions_property(void) > > return false; > > } > > > > +/* > > + * Svade and Svadu extensions represent two schemes for managing the PTE > > A/D > > + * bits. When the PTE A/D bits need to be set, the Svade extension > > indicates > > + * that a page fault will be raised. In contrast, the Svadu extension > > supports > > + * hardware updating of the PTE A/D bits. > > + * > > + * There are 4 possible combinations of these extensions in the device > > tree. > > + * The default hardware behavior for each is: > > + * > > + * 1) Neither Svade nor Svadu present in DT => It is technically unknown > > + * whether the platform uses Svade or Svadu. Xen should be prepared to > > + * handle either hardware updating of the PTE A/D bits or page faults > > when > > + * they need updating. In that case, Xen assumes Svade because it's > > + * harmless if the platform is actually Svadu, while assuming Svadu on > > real > > + * Svade hardware risks an unhandled page fault. > > + * > > + * 2) Only Svade present in DT => Xen must assume Svade to be always > > enabled. > > + * > > + * 3) Only Svadu present in DT => Xen must assume Svadu to be always > > enabled. > > + * > > + * 4) Both Svade and Svadu present in DT => Xen must assume Svadu is > > turned off > > + * at boot time by setting A/D bits. To use Svadu, the supervisor must > > + * explicitly enable it using the SBI FWFT extension. > > + * > > + * The Svade extension is mandatory and the Svadu extension is optional in > > the > > + * RVA23 profile. Platforms wanting to take advantage of Svadu can choose > > + * option 3. Platforms aware of the profile can choose option 4, and Xen > > won't > > + * get the benefit of Svadu until the SBI FWFT extension is available. > > + * > > + * In other words, hardware manages the A/D bits on its own only in case > > 3, in > > + * all the other cases software has to preset them. Instead of open coding > > this > > + * in every A/D bits user, RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade is used to mean "software is > > + * responsible for the A/D bits" and is set here for the cases 1, 2 and 4. > > + */ > > +static void __init riscv_resolve_ad_scheme(void) > > +{ > > + bool svade = riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade); > > + bool svadu = riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, RISCV_ISA_EXT_svadu); > > + > > + /* Case 3: leave the A/D bits management to hardware. */ > > + if ( svadu && !svade ) > > + return; > > + > > + /* Case 4 */ > > + if ( svadu && svade ){ > > + if ( !sbi_probe_extension(SBI_EXT_FWFT) ){ > > Nit (style): Brace placement. Sorry for that. I will fix that in v3. > Furthermore this is written in a way which Misra would call "dead code". I'd > like to suggest (leaving out comments): > > if ( svadu ) > { > if ( !svade ) > return; > > if ( !sbi_probe_extension(SBI_EXT_FWFT) ) > printk(...); > } I assume you are referring to Misra C:2012 Rule 13.5 "The right operand of a logical && or || operand shall not contain persistent side effect" If yes, IMO, I think it doesn't apply here as `svade` is evaluated before the `if` so there is no side effect that wouldn't have been executed in case of svadu=false. > > > + printk(XENLOG_WARNING "RISC-V: Both Svade and Svadu detected, > > but SBI FWFT is missing.\n" > > + "RISC-V: Defaulting to software A/D updates (Svade).\n" > > + "RISC-V: To force hardware A/D updates (Svadu), remove > > 'svade' from DT.\n"); > > Nit (style): Indentation (in multiple ways). Furthermore XENLOG_* needs > repeating after every newline. > > > + } > > + } > > + > > + /* Cases 1, 2: Xen assume Svade to be enabled */ > > + __set_bit(RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade, riscv_isa); > > Isn't this a lie (to ourselves) then? If you are talking about case 1: [1] Yes, it's technically a lie for boards shipped before the svade/svadu extension was ratified (e.g., HiFive Premier P550). These extensions merely formalized a mechanism that already existed in hardware. [2] For boards that do support svade, we could enforce DT declaration by adding it to `required_extension` as they are explicitly supporting it. However, doing so would cause boards without svade/svadu support (as described above) to hit a panic during boot. So in both case ([1], [2]), the svade extension exist either implicitely or explicitly. Therefore, force it doesn't compromize anything. > > > --- a/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/sbi.h > > +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/sbi.h > > @@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ > > #define SBI_EXT_BASE 0x10 > > #define SBI_EXT_RFENCE 0x52464E43 > > #define SBI_EXT_TIME 0x54494D45 > > +#define SBI_EXT_FWFT 0x46574654 > > > > /* SBI function IDs for BASE extension */ > > #define SBI_EXT_BASE_GET_SPEC_VERSION 0x0 > > @@ -138,6 +139,13 @@ int sbi_remote_hfence_gvma(const cpumask_t *cpu_mask, > > vaddr_t start, > > int sbi_remote_hfence_gvma_vmid(const cpumask_t *cpu_mask, vaddr_t start, > > size_t size, unsigned long vmid); > > > > +/** > > + * Check if an SBI extension ID is supported or not. > > + * @extid: The extension ID to be probed. > > + * > > + * @return: 1 or an extension specific nonzero value if yes, 0 otherwise. > > + */ > > +int sbi_probe_extension(long extid); > > /* > > Nit (style): Also add a blank line. > > > --- a/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/p2m.c > > @@ -586,42 +586,31 @@ static inline void p2m_clean_pte(pte_t *p, bool > > clean_cache) > > > > static void p2m_set_permission(pte_t *e, p2m_type_t t) > > { > > + bool svade = riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade); > > + bool svadu = riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, RISCV_ISA_EXT_svadu); > > + > > e->pte &= ~PTE_ACCESS_MASK; > > > > e->pte |= PTE_USER; > > > > /* > > - * Two schemes to manage the A and D bits are defined: > > - * • The Svade extension: when a virtual page is accessed and the A > > bit > > - * is clear, or is written and the D bit is clear, a page-fault > > - * exception is raised. > > - * • When the Svade extension is not implemented, the following > > scheme > > - * applies. > > - * When a virtual page is accessed and the A bit is clear, the PTE > > is > > - * updated to set the A bit. When the virtual page is written and > > the > > - * D bit is clear, the PTE is updated to set the D bit. When > > G-stage > > - * address translation is in use and is not Bare, the G-stage > > virtual > > - * pages may be accessed or written by implicit accesses to > > VS-level > > - * memory management data structures, such as page tables. > > - * Thereby to avoid a page-fault in case of Svade is available, it is > > - * necessary to set A and D bits. > > - * > > - * TODO: For now, it’s fine to simply set the A/D bits, since OpenSBI > > - * delegates page faults to a lower privilege mode and so OpenSBI > > - * isn't expect to handle page-faults occured in lower modes. > > - * By setting the A/D bits here, page faults that would otherwise > > - * be generated due to unset A/D bits will not occur in Xen. > > - * > > - * Currently, Xen on RISC-V does not make use of the information > > - * that could be obtained from handling such page faults, which > > - * could otherwise be useful for several use cases such as demand > > - * paging, cache-flushing optimizations, memory access > > tracking,etc. > > + * riscv_fill_hwcap() sets either RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade or > > + * RISCV_ISA_EXT_svadu (mutually exclusive) depending on the > > Svade/Svadu > > + * device tree combination (see riscv_resolve_ad_scheme()): > > + * - RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade means that software is responsible for the A/D > > + * bits. > > + * - RISCV_ISA_EXT_svadu means the hardware is responsible for the A/D > > + * bits. > > * > > - * To support the more general case and the optimizations > > mentioned > > - * above, it would be better to stop setting the A/D bits here > > and > > - * instead handle page faults that occur due to unset A/D bits. > > + * Currently, when RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade is set, Xen doesn't track A/D > > + * bits, so it does not make use of the information that could be > > + * obtained from handling the resulting page faults, which could > > + * otherwise be useful for several use cases such as demand paging, > > + * cache-flushing optimizations, memory access tracking, etc. To avoid > > + * such a page fault, Xen presets the A and D bits instead. > > */ > > - if ( riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade) ) > > + ASSERT(svade != svadu); /* exactly one of svade/svadu must be set by > > riscv_fill_hwcap() */ > > Here I'm lost: riscv_resolve_ad_scheme() specifically handles the "both set" > case. How can you then assert that exactly one of them is set? Because in the future, with SBI FWFT support, both extensions could be supported by the hardware and listed in the DT. Xen could still assume that only Svadu is turned-off at boot time but then, to use Svadu, it should explicitly enable it by using SBI FWFT extension. I agree it's not needed right now. I'll drop it until then. > > Apart from this the line is also too long and the comment doesn't match our > style. > > Jan
|
![]() |
Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our |