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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v2 3/6] xen/riscv: make Svpbmt no longer a required extension
On 10.09.2026 11:34, Baptiste Le Duc wrote:
> Without the Svpbmt extension, memory attributes (such as cacheability and
> ordering) are strictly tied to physical address ranges and enforced by the
> hardware's Physical Memory Attributes (PMA) checker.
>
> In this configuration, supervisor software relies on the platform's memory
> map:
> - peripheral device registers (MMIO) are physically mapped into
> hardware-defined I/O regions (which are implicitly non-cacheable and
> strongly-ordered)
> - regular RAM is mapped as cacheable main memory.
>
> S-mode paging can safely map these physical ranges without specifying
> page-based memory types in the PTEs, as the hardware MMU and PMA pipeline
> will correctly bypass caches for MMIO accesses and use caches for RAM
> accesses, based on the target physical address.
Provided firmware got absolutely everything right.
> Furthermore, on platforms that either feature fully hardware-coherent DMA
> or don't expose non-coherent DMA agents to the OS, page-level programmatic
> cache control via Svpbmt is not required, making it safe to boot and run
> when Svpbmt is absent.
Yet a fully coherent platform should also be possible to somehow identify?
> Drop Svpbmt from required_extensions. Introduce svpbmt_enabled, a
> __ro_after_init flag computed once in init_csr_masks() from ISA
> availability and the henvcfg.PBMTE bit. Xen cannot read menvcfg.PBMTE
> directly, since menvcfg is M-mode-only and unreadable from HS-mode, but the
> spec guarantees henvcfg.PBMTE reads as zero whenever menvcfg.PBMTE is zero,
> so checking henvcfg.PBMTE alone is sufficient.
I don't understand this logic. If menvcfg.PBMTE is non-zero, we know
nothing about (or from) henvcfg.PBMTE's setting.
> --- a/xen/arch/riscv/domain.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/domain.c
> @@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static struct csr_masks __ro_after_init csr_masks;
> #define HENVCFG_VALID_MASK 0xe0000003000000ffUL
> #define HSTATEEN0_VALID_MASK 0xde00000000000007UL
>
> +bool __ro_after_init svpbmt_enabled;
> +
> void __init init_csr_masks(void)
> {
> /*
> @@ -79,6 +81,10 @@ void __init init_csr_masks(void)
> INIT_RO_ONE_MASK(HSTATEEN0, hstateen0);
> }
>
> + svpbmt_enabled = (riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL,
> + RISCV_ISA_EXT_svpbmt)) && (ENVCFG_PBMTE &
> + csr_masks.henvcfg);
Line wrapping wants doing entirely differently here. One of the style-
conforming options is
svpbmt_enabled =
riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, RISCV_ISA_EXT_svpbmt) &&
(csr_masks.henvcfg & ENVCFG_PBMTE);
> --- a/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/page.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/riscv/include/asm/page.h
> @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
> #include <xen/types.h>
>
> #include <asm/atomic.h>
> +#include <asm/cpufeature.h>
> #include <asm/page-bits.h>
>
> #define VPN_MASK (PAGETABLE_ENTRIES - 1UL)
> @@ -42,7 +43,21 @@
> * 01 - NC Non-cacheable, idempotent, weakly-ordered Main Memory
> * 10 - IO Non-cacheable, non-idempotent, strongly-ordered I/O memory
> * 11 - Rsvd Reserved for future standard use
> + *
> + * These bits are only meaningful when Svpbmt is enabled. Otherwise they must
> + * stay 0 (PMA).
> */
> +extern bool svpbmt_enabled;
> +static inline unsigned long pte_pbmt_nocache(void)
> +{
> + return svpbmt_enabled ? BIT(61, UL) : 0;
> +}
> +
> +static inline unsigned long pte_pbmt_io(void)
> +{
> + return svpbmt_enabled ? BIT(62, UL) : 0;
> +}
Why open-code ...
> #define PTE_PBMT_NOCACHE BIT(61, UL)
> #define PTE_PBMT_IO BIT(62, UL)
... what is still available here?
> @@ -53,6 +68,7 @@
> #define PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RX (PTE_VALID | PTE_READABLE |
> PTE_EXECUTABLE | PTE_ACCESSED)
>
> #define PAGE_HYPERVISOR PAGE_HYPERVISOR_RW
> +
> /*
> * PAGE_HYPERVISOR_NOCACHE is used for ioremap().
> *
Stray change?
> @@ -82,7 +98,7 @@ enum pbmt_type {
>
> #define PTE_ACCESS_MASK (PTE_READABLE | PTE_WRITABLE | PTE_EXECUTABLE)
>
> -#define PTE_PBMT_MASK (PTE_PBMT_NOCACHE | PTE_PBMT_IO)
> +#define PTE_PBMT_MASK (BIT(61, UL) | BIT(62, UL))
I don't understand the need for this change.
Jan
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