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Re: [PATCH v1] x86/svm: Intercept CR0 writes selectively


  • To: Ross Lagerwall <ross.lagerwall@xxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Thu, 3 Sep 2026 15:48:25 +0200
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  • Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Jason Andryuk <jason.andryuk@xxxxxxx>, Teddy Astie <teddy.astie@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Thu, 03 Sep 2026 13:48:35 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 03.09.2026 15:35, Ross Lagerwall wrote:
> On 9/3/26 2:02 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 28.08.2026 16:19, Ross Lagerwall wrote:
>>> Xen does not need to track when the TS or MP bits change so opt to
>>> intercept CR0 writes selectively.
>>
>> Not anymore, which may want expressing here (or else it looks as if this
>> would have been possible from the start).
>>
>>> Aside from potentially reducing a few
>>> VMEXITs, this fixes a nested virt bug where L1 intercepts CR0_SEL_WRITE
>>> and L0 intercepts CR0_WRITE. The hardware prioritizes CR0_WRITE and so
>>> L1 never sees any CR0 writes.
>>
>> Yet if L1 sets CR0_WRITE, since intercept masks are ORed together (if
>> I'm not mistaken), ...
>>
>>> @@ -2882,7 +2884,8 @@ void asmlinkage svm_vmexit_handler(void)
>>>           break;
>>>   
>>>       case VMEXIT_CR0_READ ... VMEXIT_CR15_READ:
>>> -    case VMEXIT_CR0_WRITE ... VMEXIT_CR15_WRITE:
>>> +    case VMEXIT_CR1_WRITE ... VMEXIT_CR15_WRITE:
>>> +    case VMEXIT_CR0_SEL_WRITE:
>>>           if ( cpu_has_svm_decode && vmcb->ei.mov_cr.mov_insn )
>>>               svm_vmexit_do_cr_access(vmcb, regs);
>>>           else if ( !hvm_emulate_one_insn(x86_insn_is_cr_access, "CR 
>>> access") )
>>
>> ... we may still see VMEXIT_CR0_WRITE here (i.e. its handling cannot be
>> removed).
> 
> No, it shouldn't get here in that case. If L1 sets CR0_WRITE, it will enter
> nestedsvm_check_intercepts() and then hit the NESTEDHVM_VMEXIT_INJECT case.

Hmm, okay. Yet then I still think the original case label shouldn't be
removed, as we don't exclude the CR2 or CR8 cases either.

Jan



 


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