[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [PATCH v8 04/20] xen/riscv: introduce guest riscv,isa string


  • To: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 2 Sep 2026 16:58:01 +0200
  • Authentication-results: eu.smtp.expurgate.cloud; dkim=pass header.s=google header.d=suse.com header.i="@suse.com" header.h="Content-Transfer-Encoding:Content-Type:In-Reply-To:Autocrypt:From:Content-Language:References:Cc:To:Subject:User-Agent:MIME-Version:Date:Message-ID"
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: Romain Caritey <Romain.Caritey@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@xxxxxxxxxx>, Zheng Zhang <zhangzheng@xxxxxxxxxxx>, Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@xxxxxxx>, Connor Davis <connojdavis@xxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 02 Sep 2026 14:58:12 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 27.08.2026 17:18, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
> Introduce build_guest_isa_str() to generate the riscv,isa string to be
> passed to the guest via the Device Tree riscv,isa property.
> 
> Introduce the per-domain guest ISA bitmap, populated during domain
> creation by calling init_guest_isa().
> 
> Introduce struct riscv_isa_ext_entry with a new guest_flags field
> to filter out ISA extensions that should not be exposed to guests:
> 
> - f/d/q/v: FPU and vector context save/restore are not yet implemented
>   for guests.
> - Z*inx are not exposed either: they aren't in riscv_isa_ext[], so they
>   can never be set in riscv_isa and thus never reach a guest, and no
>   current hardware/guest-OS advertises or expects them. Supporting them
>   would be cheaper than F/D/Q (FP values stay in integer registers Xen
>   already context-switches), but is left as future work.
> - h: Nested virtualisation is not supported.
> - sstc: Xen owns the supervisor timer; guests must use SBI.
> - svade: Xen manages hardware A/D bit updates in stage-2 page tables.
> - svpbmt: Page-based memory types are not yet wired up in stage-2 code.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>

In principle
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
Nevertheless I again have something for you to further consider:

> @@ -34,9 +36,64 @@ struct riscv_isa_ext_data {
>      .name = #ext_name,                          \
>  }
>  
> +/*
> + * Which guests an extension may be handed out to, by guest XLEN.
> + *
> + * These flags express Xen's policy, not the ISA's rules: extensions which
> + * are architecturally tied to one XLEN (Zilsd on RV32, say) need no special
> + * treatment here, as they can only ever appear in the "riscv,isa" of a host
> + * of that XLEN, and guest_isa is masked against the host ISA bitmap anyway.
> + * They are only of use for extensions Xen chooses not to expose to guests of
> + * a given width despite the hardware implementing them.
> + */
> +#define RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_NONE 0
> +#define RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_RV32 (1U << 0)
> +#define RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_RV64 (1U << 1)
> +#define RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_ANY  (RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_RV32 | \
> +                                  RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_RV64)
> +
> +/*
> + * Guests are of the same width as Xen itself for the time being; once guest
> + * XLEN can differ from host XLEN (hstatus.VSXL), this becomes a per-domain
> + * property, just as guest_isa below does.
> + */
> +#if defined(CONFIG_RISCV_32)
> +#define RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_XLEN RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_RV32
> +#elif defined(CONFIG_RISCV_64)
> +#define RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_XLEN RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_RV64
> +#else
> +# error "Unsupported RISC-V bitness"
> +#endif
> +
> +struct riscv_isa_ext_entry {
> +    unsigned int id;
> +    const char *name;
> +    unsigned int guest_flags;
> +};
> +
> +#define RISCV_ISA_EXT_ENTRY(ext_name, guest_flgs)       \
> +{                                                       \
> +    .id          = RISCV_ISA_EXT_ ## ext_name,          \
> +    .name        = #ext_name,                           \
> +    .guest_flags = guest_flgs,                          \

As you're using token concatenation here already anyway, why not

    .guest_flags = RISCV_ISA_EXT_GUEST_ ## guest_flgs,     \

helping the use sites quite a bit? (Whether guest_flgs [then] is
a good parameter name is a separate question.)

Jan



 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.