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[PATCH] xen/gntdev: prevent private mappings from becoming writable


  • To: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • From: Abdifatah Suruur <suruurism@xxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 11:39:56 +0300
  • Authentication-results: eu.smtp.expurgate.cloud; dkim=pass header.s=20251104 header.d=gmail.com header.i="@gmail.com" header.h="Content-Transfer-Encoding:MIME-Version:Message-ID:Date:Subject:Cc:To:From"
  • Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, jgross@xxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 10:07:51 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

gntdev_mmap() rejects writable private (non-shared) mappings of foreign
grant pages, because a private writable mapping takes the COW path on
pages that have no proper struct-page backing.  However, VM_MAYWRITE is
left set, so userspace can map the grant read-only and then upgrade the
mapping to writable with mprotect(), hitting the same COW path the
check was written to prevent.

Clear VM_MAYWRITE for private mappings, as i915 does for its read-only
objects and as fixed in drm/vc4 (CVE-2026-68445) and drm/panthor
(CVE-2024-53071) and ptp: vmclock (commit
a5edadbae57e2298a56cf7a4e774a027905a331f).

Fixes: ab31523c2fcac ("xen/gntdev: allow usermode to map granted pages")
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Signed-off-by: Abdifatah Suruur <suruurism@xxxxxxxxx>

---
diff --git a/drivers/xen/gntdev.c b/drivers/xen/gntdev.c
index 1dcc4675580ed..b71f5bae25b63 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/gntdev.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/gntdev.c
@@ -1066,6 +1066,13 @@ static int gntdev_mmap(struct file *flip, struct 
vm_area_struct *vma)
        if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_WRITE) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
                return -EINVAL;
 
+       /*
+        * Private mappings of foreign grant pages must never become
+        * writable: they would take the COW path on granted pages.
+        */
+       if (!(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED))
+               vm_flags_clear(vma, VM_MAYWRITE);
+
        pr_debug("map %d+%d at %lx (pgoff %lx)\n",
                 index, count, vma->vm_start, vma->vm_pgoff);
 



 


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