[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads


  • To: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>, <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: "Orzel, Michal" <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 09:47:51 +0200
  • Arc-authentication-results: i=1; mx.microsoft.com 1; spf=pass (sender ip is 165.204.84.17) smtp.rcpttodomain=arm.com smtp.mailfrom=amd.com; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine sp=quarantine pct=100) action=none header.from=amd.com; dkim=none (message not signed); arc=none (0)
  • Arc-message-signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=microsoft.com; s=arcselector10001; h=From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-ChunkCount:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-0:X-MS-Exchange-AntiSpam-MessageData-1; bh=Jr/R1bH16Z1lchxKYimZiKXPqs5gtPksoeyzxN1bjNo=; b=ckMAyeM/Z7Ht+Z+XKuP020zNRiuk7Ek61El68CTyZ5Msw+pXuJv4J+C9AnerOGDDbH6ElDTaRBNnFmGSa3G1d9V+Bhj0T5M8weENojWhNxXpP5AX56ZJTMz4yBd3JsPbGegLlqRnGnakyDfjWp4Ni6ieuIErQ0YvEyx8DDwrj7+0u19AaTqWahpuYWpXR7BcVbjxNffaXUs7xX0JghFnbf8KZUl04yzPu74x0BWkMiE2IhowB4xJULrsquJjkxpfivGLbRVhtCWhKy3SPTk4AQCnvNLKQESeXfULyOpGY0XrEjnCWaKFMdRg7SSvxtuxP+v8gITmFe+lL7JRPuWffg==
  • Arc-seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; s=arcselector10001; d=microsoft.com; cv=none; b=iQ9nGPITrwLyhvDia8TIEVe1RQBuOaKZvaBT48EmUDCRTBpqtCS2f+cWArLoUhbaqnRSS85yT0UpKJmT7gAtDTD6k2DBsoFdh25D5OKat/waERi8G4UzTAMEWpV0mvy05oFEolcGtT1UkfQwq+k+Df8x8tUNJUAlG8dozOAffONBmZr+UsnK3VXx1SMpOxEOjK+sKoeG4EPfL/1PkxymxjBNmCD5AmV/pWiclaKX1G16XlAAyCJ726GrsA8NHZpe5CyJ2iOOuYH1kPfqBMcFHN1QFfFaZb6FTpjZR+7WLkWdebqpRtedIL+AxqufRz0DxZ3PfMu1UsIkxAT2He+cHg==
  • Authentication-results: eu.smtp.expurgate.cloud; dkim=pass header.s=selector1 header.d=amd.com header.i="@amd.com" header.h="From:Date:Subject:Message-ID:Content-Type:MIME-Version:X-MS-Exchange-SenderADCheck"
  • Cc: Volodymyr Babchuk <volodymyr_babchuk@xxxxxxxx>, Jens Wiklander <jenswi@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 19 Aug 2026 07:48:22 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>


On 18-Aug-26 14:16, Bertrand Marquis wrote:
> Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a
> possible vulnerability.
> 
> ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable
> TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy
> does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from
> the live TX mapping.
> 
> For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the
> source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a
> sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field,
> the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds
> read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the
> receiver's RX buffer.
> 
> The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by
> default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the
> C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy.
> 
> Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that
> validation and use consume the same snapshot.
> 
> Link: 
> https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc
> Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM")
> Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx>
> ---
>  xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++
>  1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
> index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644
> --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c
> @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
>  
>      /* create a copy of the message header */
>      memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg));
> +    /*
> +     * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed
> +     * again after this point.
This is a bit misleading because it *is* accessed in ffa_msg_send2_vm. The
comment should say what you wrote as the last paragraph in the commit msg.

With that:
Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>

~Michal




 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.