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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] xen/arm: ffa: Harden SEND2 against invented loads
On 18-Aug-26 14:16, Bertrand Marquis wrote: > Research into compiler-invented loads has flagged FFA_MSG_SEND2 as a > possible vulnerability. > > ffa_handle_msg_send2() copies the message header from the guest-writable > TX buffer before validating and using its fields. A plain structure copy > does not prevent the compiler from re-deriving later field accesses from > the live TX mapping. > > For VM-to-VM messages, msg_offset and msg_size are validated against the > source and destination buffers, then used to copy the payload. If a > sibling vCPU changes the header and the compiler reloads either field, > the checked and used values can differ. This can cause an out-of-bounds > read from the sender's TX buffer or an out-of-bounds write into the > receiver's RX buffer. > > The cross-VM path is gated by CONFIG_FFA_VM_TO_VM, which is disabled by > default. The audit ranks the likelihood of such a reload as low, but the > C semantics do not guarantee that later accesses use the stack copy. > > Add a compiler barrier immediately after copying the header so that > validation and use consume the same snapshot. > > Link: > https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/schrodingers-toctou/blob/main/observer-effect/audits/audit-xen-tee-mediator-RELEASE-4.21.1.md#tm-2--ff-a-txrx-buffers-ffa_shmc-ffa_msgc > Fixes: 98af565b1e61 ("xen/arm: ffa: Add indirect message between VM") > Signed-off-by: Bertrand Marquis <bertrand.marquis@xxxxxxx> > --- > xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c | 5 +++++ > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c > index 1eadc62870f2..39f561c8237f 100644 > --- a/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c > +++ b/xen/arch/arm/tee/ffa_msg.c > @@ -257,6 +257,11 @@ int32_t ffa_handle_msg_send2(struct cpu_user_regs *regs) > > /* create a copy of the message header */ > memcpy(&src_msg, tx_buf, sizeof(src_msg)); > + /* > + * Make sure that "tx_buf" which is shared with the guest isn't accessed > + * again after this point. This is a bit misleading because it *is* accessed in ffa_msg_send2_vm. The comment should say what you wrote as the last paragraph in the commit msg. With that: Reviewed-by: Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx> ~Michal
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