[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [PATCH v1 2/3] xen/domain: fix UBSAN null pointer dereference in vcpu_info_reset()


  • To: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 14:03:52 +0200
  • Authentication-results: eu.smtp.expurgate.cloud; dkim=pass header.s=google header.d=suse.com header.i="@suse.com" header.h="Content-Transfer-Encoding:In-Reply-To:Autocrypt:From:Content-Language:References:Cc:To:Subject:User-Agent:MIME-Version:Date:Message-ID"
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@xxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 20 May 2026 12:03:59 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 20.05.2026 13:33, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/19/26 1:53 PM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> On 19.05.2026 13:22, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>> On 5/19/26 12:55 PM, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>>> On 5/19/26 11:37 AM, Jan Beulich wrote:
>>>>> On 19.05.2026 10:39, Oleksii Kurochko wrote:
>>>>>> vcpu_info_reset() maps v->vcpu_info_area.map to the per-vcpu slot inside
>>>>>> the domain's shared_info page for vcpus with id < XEN_LEGACY_MAX_VCPUS,
>>>>>> and falls back to dummy_vcpu_info for vcpus beyond that limit.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> However, it does not guard against d->shared_info being NULL.  The
>>>>>> shared_info() macro expands to a member access through d->shared_info,
>>>>>> so when an architecture does not allocate a shared_info page the
>>>>>> dereference triggers UBSAN:
>>>>>>     UBSAN: Undefined behaviour in common/domain.c:325:10
>>>>>>     member access within null pointer of type 'struct shared_info_t'
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Extend the existing fallback condition to also cover the case where no
>>>>>> shared_info page has been allocated, mapping the vcpu to dummy_vcpu_info
>>>>>> instead. This is the correct behaviour: dummy_vcpu_info already serves
>>>>>> as the safe stand-in for vcpus that have no usable shared_info slot.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Fixes: 295514ff75506 ("common: convert vCPU info area registration")
>>>>>
>>>>> I question this, largely (but not only) because I also ...
>>>>>
>>>>>> Signed-off-by: Oleksii Kurochko <oleksii.kurochko@xxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>> Reviewed-by: Baptiste Le Duc <baptiste.le-duc@xxxxxxxxxx>
>>>>>> ---
>>>>>> RISC-V does not allocate a shared_info page at the momemnt because its
>>>>>> guests run in dom0less mode and do not use the Xen PV ABI, so
>>>>>> d->shared_info remains NULL throughout domain lifetime.
>>>>>
>>>>> ... question this mode of operation. Yes, you may (for now) be able to
>>>>> get
>>>>> away without, but e.g. event channels will want supporting at some point.
>>>>> Which will require a shared info page. Better put that in place right
>>>>> away,
>>>>> even if the guests you test with don't use it (yet). Certain other common
>>>>> code also assumes d->shared_info to never be NULL for an alive domain.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> Would it be fine than to allocate it in arch_domain_create() ... :
>>>>
>>>>       if ( (d->shared_info = alloc_xenheap_pages(0, 0)) == NULL )
>>>>           goto fail;
>>>>
>>>>       clear_page(d->shared_info);
>>>>
>>>> ... but without calling share_xen_page_with_guest() after that
>>>> allocation as share_xen_page_with_guest() isn't implemented at the moment?
>>
>> I would have said "yes" here, but ...
>>
>>> Or could it be an option for all arch-s move allocation of
>>> d->shared_info to domain_create() in common just after arch_domain_create()?
>>
>> ... Andrew's reply pretty much rules out not only this option, but the
>> shared-info-page concept as a whole (for RISC-V). See my reply there. In
>> the meantime, the change as suggested may then indeed be what we want to
>> go with, albeit (a) with a better description and (b) perhaps covering
>> all d->shared_info uses.
> 
> Looking at guest kernel code (Linux), FIFO is tried first, so if RISC-V 
> is going to support only FIFO, d->shared_info could legally be NULL.
> 
> Looking at the Xen side, if an architecture decides to support only 
> FIFO, d->shared_info is touched only in vcpu_info_reset(), which is 
> called from vcpu_create().
> 
> All other places where d->shared_info is accessed should not be 
> reachable except for one case in event_fifo.c: when a guest issues the 
> EVTCHNOP_init_control hypercall, setup_ports() reads from shared_info(d, 
> evtchn_pending):
>    static void setup_ports(struct domain *d, unsigned int prev_evtchns)
>    {
>    ...
>            if ( guest_test_bit(d, port, &shared_info(d, evtchn_pending))
>                evtchn->pending = true;
>    ...
>        }
>    }
> 
> This looks like it handles the transition from the 2L ABI to the FIFO 
> ABI: if a guest started with 2L and then switched to FIFO, any events 
> already pending in shared_info(d, evtchn_pending) need to be migrated to 
> FIFO's per-channel evtchn->pending flag. But it looks like I am missing 
> something here as I mentioned at the start that Linux uses or FIFO or 2L.
> 
> Am I missing something?

Quite likely you aren't, but I didn't check. My earlier "covering all" may
well resolve to merely stating things accordingly in the patch description.

Jan



 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.