[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

Re: [PATCH] x86/xen: Fix a potential problem in xen_e820_resolve_conflicts()


  • To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jürgen Groß <jgross@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Tue, 5 May 2026 11:13:33 +0200
  • Authentication-results: eu.smtp.expurgate.cloud; dkim=pass header.s=google header.d=suse.com header.i="@suse.com" header.h="In-Reply-To:Autocrypt:From:Content-Language:References:Cc:To:Subject:User-Agent:MIME-Version:Date:Message-ID"
  • Autocrypt: addr=jgross@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsBNBFOMcBYBCACgGjqjoGvbEouQZw/ToiBg9W98AlM2QHV+iNHsEs7kxWhKMjrioyspZKOB ycWxw3ie3j9uvg9EOB3aN4xiTv4qbnGiTr3oJhkB1gsb6ToJQZ8uxGq2kaV2KL9650I1SJve dYm8Of8Zd621lSmoKOwlNClALZNew72NjJLEzTalU1OdT7/i1TXkH09XSSI8mEQ/ouNcMvIJ NwQpd369y9bfIhWUiVXEK7MlRgUG6MvIj6Y3Am/BBLUVbDa4+gmzDC9ezlZkTZG2t14zWPvx XP3FAp2pkW0xqG7/377qptDmrk42GlSKN4z76ELnLxussxc7I2hx18NUcbP8+uty4bMxABEB AAHNH0p1ZXJnZW4gR3Jvc3MgPGpncm9zc0BzdXNlLmNvbT7CwHkEEwECACMFAlOMcK8CGwMH CwkIBwMCAQYVCAIJCgsEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAAKCRCw3p3WKL8TL8eZB/9G0juS/kDY9LhEXseh mE9U+iA1VsLhgDqVbsOtZ/S14LRFHczNd/Lqkn7souCSoyWsBs3/wO+OjPvxf7m+Ef+sMtr0 G5lCWEWa9wa0IXx5HRPW/ScL+e4AVUbL7rurYMfwCzco+7TfjhMEOkC+va5gzi1KrErgNRHH kg3PhlnRY0Udyqx++UYkAsN4TQuEhNN32MvN0Np3WlBJOgKcuXpIElmMM5f1BBzJSKBkW0Jc Wy3h2Wy912vHKpPV/Xv7ZwVJ27v7KcuZcErtptDevAljxJtE7aJG6WiBzm+v9EswyWxwMCIO RoVBYuiocc51872tRGywc03xaQydB+9R7BHPzsBNBFOMcBYBCADLMfoA44MwGOB9YT1V4KCy vAfd7E0BTfaAurbG+Olacciz3yd09QOmejFZC6AnoykydyvTFLAWYcSCdISMr88COmmCbJzn sHAogjexXiif6ANUUlHpjxlHCCcELmZUzomNDnEOTxZFeWMTFF9Rf2k2F0Tl4E5kmsNGgtSa aMO0rNZoOEiD/7UfPP3dfh8JCQ1VtUUsQtT1sxos8Eb/HmriJhnaTZ7Hp3jtgTVkV0ybpgFg w6WMaRkrBh17mV0z2ajjmabB7SJxcouSkR0hcpNl4oM74d2/VqoW4BxxxOD1FcNCObCELfIS auZx+XT6s+CE7Qi/c44ibBMR7hyjdzWbABEBAAHCwF8EGAECAAkFAlOMcBYCGwwACgkQsN6d 1ii/Ey9D+Af/WFr3q+bg/8v5tCknCtn92d5lyYTBNt7xgWzDZX8G6/pngzKyWfedArllp0Pn fgIXtMNV+3t8Li1Tg843EXkP7+2+CQ98MB8XvvPLYAfW8nNDV85TyVgWlldNcgdv7nn1Sq8g HwB2BHdIAkYce3hEoDQXt/mKlgEGsLpzJcnLKimtPXQQy9TxUaLBe9PInPd+Ohix0XOlY+Uk QFEx50Ki3rSDl2Zt2tnkNYKUCvTJq7jvOlaPd6d/W0tZqpyy7KVay+K4aMobDsodB3dvEAs6 ScCnh03dDAFgIq5nsB11j3KPKdVoPlfucX2c7kGNH+LUMbzqV6beIENfNexkOfxHfw==
  • Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@xxxxxxxxxx>, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@xxxxxxxxxx>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@xxxxxxxxxx>, Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>, Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@xxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, x86@xxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Tue, 05 May 2026 09:13:49 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 05.05.26 10:43, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 05.05.2026 10:06, Juergen Gross wrote:
When fixing a conflict in xen_e820_resolve_conflicts(), the loop over
the E820 map entries needs to be restarted, as the E820 map will have
been modified by the fix. Otherwise entries might be skipped by
accident.

Fixes: be35d91c8880 ("xen: tolerate ACPI NVS memory overlapping with Xen allocated 
memory")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@xxxxxxxx>

First, while trying to review this, isn't there another issue in
xen_e820_swap_entry_with_ram(), in that

                        entry->addr = entry_end - swap_size +
                                      swap_addr - swap_entry->addr;


really means to be

                        entry->addr = entry_end - swap_size +
                                      swap_entry->addr - swap_addr;

(affecting non-page-aligned E820 entries)?

Yes, you are right.


Further, that function converts swap_entry to the page-aligned superset
of the passed in range. How is it guaranteed that this new range won't
overlap with the predecessor and/or successor one? Wouldn't that need
to be conversion to the page-aligned subset instead?

This is subtle. :-)

We are converting to RAM (usable), so the type value is 1. e820__update_table()
will handle overlaps just fine, with higher type values "winning" against lower
ones. So any other region overlapping with the new RAM region will result in
another conflict in the next loop iteration.

Using the page-aligned subset would result in possible memory holes, which would
be problematic (the kernel or page tables shouldn't have holes, after all).


And then, is passing the page-aligned superset to xen_add_remap_nonram()
really appropriate? Why would any leading or trailing space there be
subject to remapping?

How would you want to remap a sub-page physical memory area to another location
without affecting the rest of the page? We are reworking the final p2m map here.


--- a/arch/x86/xen/setup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/setup.c
@@ -695,17 +695,22 @@ static void __init xen_e820_resolve_conflicts(phys_addr_t 
start,
                return;
end = start + size;
-       entry = xen_e820_table.entries;
+       mapcnt = 0;
- for (mapcnt = 0; mapcnt < xen_e820_table.nr_entries; mapcnt++) {
+       while (mapcnt < xen_e820_table.nr_entries) {
+               entry = xen_e820_table.entries + mapcnt;
                if (entry->addr >= end)
                        return;
if (entry->addr + entry->size > start &&
-                   entry->type == E820_TYPE_NVS)
+                   entry->type == E820_TYPE_NVS) {
                        xen_e820_swap_entry_with_ram(entry);
+                       /* E820 map has been changed, restart loop! */
+                       mapcnt = 0;
+                       continue;
+               }
- entry++;
+               mapcnt++;
        }
  }

Given what exactly xen_e820_swap_entry_with_ram() does, restarting from
entry 0 looks to be needed only if the non-RAM entry ended up moving down
(strictly speaking even there it wouldn't need to be entry 0). If it
moved up, simply not incrementing mapcnt would look to suffice. Since the
extra overhead is likely tolerable here (with simplicity of the code
being more important), this may want mentioning in a code comment (or at
least the description). Preferably with that:
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

Thanks,


Juergen

Attachment: OpenPGP_0xB0DE9DD628BF132F.asc
Description: OpenPGP public key

Attachment: OpenPGP_signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature


 


Rackspace

Lists.xenproject.org is hosted with RackSpace, monitoring our
servers 24x7x365 and backed by RackSpace's Fanatical Support®.