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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v4 04/14] x86/boot: Document the ordering dependency of _svm_cpu_up()
On 02/03/2026 3:34 pm, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 02.03.2026 16:20, Andrew Cooper wrote: >> On 27/02/2026 11:16 pm, Andrew Cooper wrote: >>> Lets just say this took an unreasoanble amount of time and effort to track >>> down, when trying to move traps_init() earlier during boot. >>> >>> When the SYSCALL linkage MSRs are not configured ahead of _svm_cpu_up() on >>> the >>> BSP, the first context switch into PV uses svm_load_segs() and clobbers the >>> later-set-up linkage with the 0's cached here, causing hypercalls issues by >>> the PV guest to enter at 0 in supervisor mode on the user stack. >>> >>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx> >>> --- >>> CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@xxxxxxxx> >>> CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx> >>> >>> v4: >>> * New >>> >>> It occurs to me that it's not actually 0's we cache here. It's whatever >>> context was left from prior to Xen. We still don't reliably clean unused >>> MSRs. > Actually, with this, ... > >>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c >>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c >>> @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ >>> #include <asm/p2m.h> >>> #include <asm/paging.h> >>> #include <asm/processor.h> >>> +#include <asm/traps.h> >>> #include <asm/vm_event.h> >>> #include <asm/x86_emulate.h> >>> >>> @@ -1581,6 +1582,21 @@ static int _svm_cpu_up(bool bsp) >>> /* Initialize OSVW bits to be used by guests */ >>> svm_host_osvw_init(); >>> >>> + /* >>> + * VMSAVE writes out the current full FS, GS, LDTR and TR segments, and >>> + * the GS_SHADOW, SYSENTER and SYSCALL linkage MSRs. >>> + * >>> + * The segment data gets modified by the svm_load_segs() optimisation >>> for >>> + * PV context switches, but all values get reloaded at that point, as >>> well >>> + * as during context switch from SVM. >>> + * >>> + * If PV guests are available (and FRED is not in use), it is critical >>> + * that the SYSCALL linkage MSRs been configured at this juncture. >>> + */ >>> + ASSERT(opt_fred >= 0); /* Confirm that FRED-ness has been resolved */ >>> + if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV) && !opt_fred ) >>> + ASSERT(rdmsr(MSR_LSTAR)); >> It has occurred to me that this is subtly wrong. While FRED doesn't use >> LSTAR/SFMASK, it does reuse STAR. >> >> So this needs to be: >> >> if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PV) ) >> ASSERT(rdmsr(MSR_STAR)); >> >> with the include dropped, as the final sentence adjusted to say "even >> with FRED". > ... if we inherit a non-zero value, is the assertion of much use this way? The inherited case is normally when we're KEXEC'd into. That doesn't happen very much with Xen, and is more of a concern with Linux. But yes, IMO the assertion is still useful. CI boots from clean, so the ASSERT() will catch accidental code movement which violates the dependency. ~Andrew
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