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Re: [BUG] common/domctl: xsm update for get_domain_state access


  • To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: "Daniel P. Smith" <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 10:32:16 -0500
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  • Cc: Chris Rogers <rogersc@xxxxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 18 Feb 2026 15:32:45 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 2/18/26 10:03, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 18.02.2026 15:33, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
On 2/17/26 04:34, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 16.02.2026 22:57, Daniel P. Smith wrote:
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ static void set_domain_state_info(struct 
xen_domctl_get_domain_state *info,
   int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state *info, struct domain 
*d,
                        domid_t *domid)
   {
-    unsigned int dom;
+    unsigned int dom = 0;
       int rc = -ENOENT;
       struct domain *hdl;
@@ -219,6 +219,10 @@ int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state *info, struct domain *d, if ( d )
       {
+        rc = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
+        if ( rc )
+            return rc;
+
           set_domain_state_info(info, d);
return 0;
@@ -238,10 +242,10 @@ int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state 
*info, struct domain *d,
while ( dom_state_changed )
       {
-        dom = find_first_bit(dom_state_changed, DOMID_MASK + 1);
+        dom = find_next_bit(dom_state_changed, DOMID_MASK + 1, dom);
           if ( dom >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
               break;
-        if ( test_and_clear_bit(dom, dom_state_changed) )
+        if ( test_bit(dom, dom_state_changed) )
           {
               *domid = dom;

This is problematic wrt other work (already talked about in the distant past,
but sadly only making little progress) towards trying to pull some of the
sub-ops out of the domctl-locked region. This subop is one of the prime
candidates, yet only if the test_and_clear_bit() remains here.

Okay, but we can't be clearing the bit if the src domain doesn't have
access. When considering that xsm_domctl() does a no-op check for
XEN_DOMCTL_get_domain_state, deferring to xsm_get_domain_state(), then
any domain could invoke the OP with DOMID_INVALID and clear the bit
before access is checked.

If you want to ensure atomic operations on the bit field, while I am not
a fan of this, a combination with set_bit() could be done. Let the
test_and_clear_bit() remain and then if access check fails, use
set_bit() to put it back. Would that be sufficient for your objective?

No, that could then confuse a legitimate (for that domain) caller. IOW
you would still build upon the domctl lock serializing things. I think
you want to do the XSM check first, and only then use test_and_clear_bit().


Currently, acquiring the struct domain pointer is inside the if condition. This would have to be moved outside the if condition to be able to do the access check before calling the bit operation. Which brings up the question for me, if it is reordered in this fashion, why not use clear_bit(), aiui it should be atomic as well.


@@ -249,6 +253,15 @@ int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state 
*info, struct domain *d,
if ( d )
               {
+                rc = xsm_get_domain_state(XSM_XS_PRIV, d);
+                if ( rc )
+                {
+                    rcu_unlock_domain(d);
+                    rc = -ENOENT;

As you don't otherwise use xsm_get_domain_state()'s return value, the need
for this assignment can be eliminated by putting the function call straight
in the if(). Then again, to address the remark above, overall code structure
will need to change quite a bit anyway (so the remark here may be moot).

I can drop the use of rc here and inline it.

+                    dom++;

It may be nice to eliminate the need to have this in two places (here and ...

+                    continue;
+                }
+
                   set_domain_state_info(info, d);
rcu_unlock_domain(d);
@@ -256,10 +269,13 @@ int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state 
*info, struct domain *d,
               else
                   memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
+ clear_bit(dom, dom_state_changed);
               rc = 0;
break;
           }
+
+        dom++;
       }

... here), by having the variable's initializer be -1 and then using dom + 1
in the find_next_bit() invocation.

If you want this way, then there are two options, make dom no longer
unsigned or be willing to allow unsigned int overflow. If we go with the
former, If you agree, I would leave it as an int as that should cover
the range of valid domids.

I wouldn't outright nak use of plain int, but I'm putting in effort to remove
such undue uses of that type. Unsigned overflow is well-defined aiui, so I
see no reason why the variable can't remain "unsigned int".

Honestly, I'm not sure why it was not domid_t in the first place. I can't keep all the rules, but I thought MISRA frowned on overflow usages (abuse?) like this. If you will ack it with it as a uint or as a domid_t, then I have no issue doing it this way.

v/r,
dps




 


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