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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v4] xen/domain: introduce DOMID_ANY
On 04.02.26 11:04, Jan Beulich wrote: On 04.02.2026 11:01, Juergen Gross wrote:On 04.02.26 10:51, Jan Beulich wrote:On 04.02.2026 10:25, Juergen Gross wrote:On 04.02.26 10:15, Jan Beulich wrote:On 04.02.2026 10:00, Roger Pau Monné wrote:On Wed, Feb 04, 2026 at 08:56:10AM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:On 04.02.2026 08:49, Roger Pau Monné wrote:Also, I would remove the tools guards, I think once a DOMID_ constant is allocated it becomes part of the public ABI, and it cannot be withdrawn. See for example DOMID_IDLE: it's only used internally in the hypervisor AFAICT, yet the define is fully visible in the headers.It was me to ask for it to be guarded like this. DOMID_IDLE (and perhaps others) not being guarded (at least for IDLE: by just __XEN__) imo was a mistake. That mistake may in fact be correctable, if we could prove that the ID cannot usefully be passed into anywhere.Even if it's not passed into anything, does it make sense to guard them? The reserved domid values are already consumed, ie: cannot be reused in any way. It just seem to me like more ifdefery churn for no specific benefit.Well. From an abstract perspective, purely hypothetical at this point, I could see a potential need to re-number them, e.g. to simplify checking against groups of these special IDs. Yes, excess #ifdef-ary is an issue. Excess exposure of things also is, though. Finding the right balance between both can be interesting.I have a patch in work which would want DOMID_ANY not be guarded. I think especially DOMID_ANY could be useful for other cases, too.Mind me asking where, outside of the toolstack, you intend to use it?I'd like to be able to use it for Xenstore permissions. Primary use case would be to allow the special watches for domain creation and removal to be usable for all guests, but there might be use cases where a domU wants to give node read access for everyone.Would that require exposing beyond the toolstack's boundaries? Yes, as this would require the user to specify DOMID_ANY as the domid in struct xs_permissions. Juergen Attachment:
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