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Ping: [PATCH] flask: fix gcov build with gcc14+


  • To: Daniel Smith <dpsmith@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Mon, 19 Jan 2026 15:50:02 +0100
  • Autocrypt: addr=jbeulich@xxxxxxxx; keydata= xsDiBFk3nEQRBADAEaSw6zC/EJkiwGPXbWtPxl2xCdSoeepS07jW8UgcHNurfHvUzogEq5xk hu507c3BarVjyWCJOylMNR98Yd8VqD9UfmX0Hb8/BrA+Hl6/DB/eqGptrf4BSRwcZQM32aZK 7Pj2XbGWIUrZrd70x1eAP9QE3P79Y2oLrsCgbZJfEwCgvz9JjGmQqQkRiTVzlZVCJYcyGGsD /0tbFCzD2h20ahe8rC1gbb3K3qk+LpBtvjBu1RY9drYk0NymiGbJWZgab6t1jM7sk2vuf0Py O9Hf9XBmK0uE9IgMaiCpc32XV9oASz6UJebwkX+zF2jG5I1BfnO9g7KlotcA/v5ClMjgo6Gl MDY4HxoSRu3i1cqqSDtVlt+AOVBJBACrZcnHAUSuCXBPy0jOlBhxPqRWv6ND4c9PH1xjQ3NP nxJuMBS8rnNg22uyfAgmBKNLpLgAGVRMZGaGoJObGf72s6TeIqKJo/LtggAS9qAUiuKVnygo 3wjfkS9A3DRO+SpU7JqWdsveeIQyeyEJ/8PTowmSQLakF+3fote9ybzd880fSmFuIEJldWxp Y2ggPGpiZXVsaWNoQHN1c2UuY29tPsJgBBMRAgAgBQJZN5xEAhsDBgsJCAcDAgQVAggDBBYC AwECHgECF4AACgkQoDSui/t3IH4J+wCfQ5jHdEjCRHj23O/5ttg9r9OIruwAn3103WUITZee e7Sbg12UgcQ5lv7SzsFNBFk3nEQQCACCuTjCjFOUdi5Nm244F+78kLghRcin/awv+IrTcIWF hUpSs1Y91iQQ7KItirz5uwCPlwejSJDQJLIS+QtJHaXDXeV6NI0Uef1hP20+y8qydDiVkv6l IreXjTb7DvksRgJNvCkWtYnlS3mYvQ9NzS9PhyALWbXnH6sIJd2O9lKS1Mrfq+y0IXCP10eS FFGg+Av3IQeFatkJAyju0PPthyTqxSI4lZYuJVPknzgaeuJv/2NccrPvmeDg6Coe7ZIeQ8Yj t0ARxu2xytAkkLCel1Lz1WLmwLstV30g80nkgZf/wr+/BXJW/oIvRlonUkxv+IbBM3dX2OV8 AmRv1ySWPTP7AAMFB/9PQK/VtlNUJvg8GXj9ootzrteGfVZVVT4XBJkfwBcpC/XcPzldjv+3 HYudvpdNK3lLujXeA5fLOH+Z/G9WBc5pFVSMocI71I8bT8lIAzreg0WvkWg5V2WZsUMlnDL9 mpwIGFhlbM3gfDMs7MPMu8YQRFVdUvtSpaAs8OFfGQ0ia3LGZcjA6Ik2+xcqscEJzNH+qh8V m5jjp28yZgaqTaRbg3M/+MTbMpicpZuqF4rnB0AQD12/3BNWDR6bmh+EkYSMcEIpQmBM51qM EKYTQGybRCjpnKHGOxG0rfFY1085mBDZCH5Kx0cl0HVJuQKC+dV2ZY5AqjcKwAxpE75MLFkr wkkEGBECAAkFAlk3nEQCGwwACgkQoDSui/t3IH7nnwCfcJWUDUFKdCsBH/E5d+0ZnMQi+G0A nAuWpQkjM1ASeQwSHEeAWPgskBQL
  • Cc: "xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx" <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Delivery-date: Mon, 19 Jan 2026 14:50:04 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

Daniel,

On 08.01.2026 10:18, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Gcc's "threading" of conditionals can lead to undue warnings, as reported
> in e.g. https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=116519 (no matter
> that the overall situation is different there). While my gcc15 complains
> ("buf[2] may be used uninitialized in this function") about only two of
> the three instances (not about the one in type_read()), adjust all three
> to be on the safe side.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>

any chance of an ack (or otherwise)?

Thanks, Jan

> ---
> While auditing uses of next_entry(), I noticed POLICYDB_VERSION_ROLETRANS
> dependent ones in policydb_read(): How come the 4th slot isn't used at all
> there (not even checked for being e.g. zero, i.e. holding no useful data)?
> Then again other instances can be found where data is read but outright
> ignored.
> 
> --- a/xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.c
> +++ b/xen/xsm/flask/ss/policydb.c
> @@ -1271,7 +1271,10 @@ static int cf_check role_read(struct pol
>      if ( ver >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY )
>          rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * 3);
>      else
> +    {
>          rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * 2);
> +        buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(0); /* gcc14 onwards */
> +    }
>  
>      if ( rc < 0 )
>          goto bad;
> @@ -1342,7 +1345,10 @@ static int cf_check type_read(struct pol
>      if ( ver >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY )
>          rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * 4);
>      else
> +    {
>          rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * 3);
> +        buf[3] = cpu_to_le32(0); /* gcc14 onwards */
> +    }
>  
>      if ( rc < 0 )
>          goto bad;
> @@ -1436,7 +1442,10 @@ static int cf_check user_read(struct pol
>      if ( ver >= POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY )
>          rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * 3);
>      else
> +    {
>          rc = next_entry(buf, fp, sizeof(buf[0]) * 2);
> +        buf[2] = cpu_to_le32(0); /* gcc14 onwards */
> +    }
>  
>      if ( rc < 0 )
>          goto bad;




 


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