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Re: [PATCH] x86/CPU/AMD: avoid printing reset reasons on Xen domU
- To: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@xxxxxxxxxx>, Borislav Petkov <bp@xxxxxxxxx>
- From: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@ariadne.space>
- Date: Fri, 19 Dec 2025 15:19:28 -0800
- Cc: linux-kernel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, mario.limonciello@xxxxxxx, darwi@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, sandipan.das@xxxxxxx, kai.huang@xxxxxxxxx, me@xxxxxxxxxxx, yazen.ghannam@xxxxxxx, riel@xxxxxxxxxxx, peterz@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, hpa@xxxxxxxxx, x86@xxxxxxxxxx, tglx@xxxxxxxxxxxxx, mingo@xxxxxxxxxx, dave.hansen@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Delivery-date: Fri, 19 Dec 2025 23:20:02 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
- Mail-alias-created-date: 1688796967087
Hi,
On 12/19/25 08:09, Sean Christopherson wrote:
On Fri, Dec 19, 2025, Borislav Petkov wrote:
On December 19, 2025 1:01:31 AM UTC, Ariadne Conill <ariadne@ariadne.space>
wrote:
Xen domU cannot access the given MMIO address for security reasons,
resulting in a failed hypercall in ioremap() due to permissions.
Why does that matter though? Ah, because set_pte() assumes success, and so
presumably the failed hypercall goes unnoticed and trying to access the MMIO
#PFs due to !PRESENT mapping.
Yes, which results in the guest panicing on Zen platforms.
Fixes: ab8131028710 ("x86/CPU/AMD: Print the reason for the last reset")
Signed-off-by: Ariadne Conill <ariadne@ariadne.space>
Cc: xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Cc: stable@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 6 ++++++
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index a6f88ca1a6b4..99308fba4d7d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@
# include <asm/mmconfig.h>
#endif
+#include <xen/xen.h>
+
#include "cpu.h"
u16 invlpgb_count_max __ro_after_init = 1;
@@ -1333,6 +1335,10 @@ static __init int print_s5_reset_status_mmio(void)
if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_ZEN))
return 0;
+ /* Xen PV domU cannot access hardware directly, so bail for domU case */
Heh, Xen on Zen crime.
+ if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XENPV) && !xen_initial_domain())
+ return 0;
+
addr = ioremap(FCH_PM_BASE + FCH_PM_S5_RESET_STATUS, sizeof(value));
if (!addr)
return 0;
Sean, looka here. The other hypervisor wants other checks.
Time to whip out the X86_FEATURE_HYPERVISOR check.
LOL, Ariadne, be honest, how much did Boris pay you? :-D
Nothing :)
At Edera we have been running with this patch for a few months, I just
forgot to upstream it.
I was reminded of this patch when an Alpine user opened a bug[0]
demonstrating the same behavior on 6.18.
[0]: https://gitlab.alpinelinux.org/alpine/aports/-/issues/17789
Jokes aside, I suppose I'm fine adding a HYPERVISOR check, but at the same time,
how is this not a Xen bug? Refusing to create a mapping because the VM doesn't
have a device defined at a given GPA is pretty hostile behavior for a
hypervisor.
I think it would be better to fix this in a more generic way if we can.
Ariadne
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