[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH v4 12/18] xen/riscv: Implement p2m_pte_from_mfn() and support PBMT configuration
On 09.10.2025 11:21, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: > > On 10/7/25 3:09 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >> On 29.09.2025 15:30, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >>> On 9/22/25 6:28 PM, Jan Beulich wrote: >>>> On 17.09.2025 23:55, Oleksii Kurochko wrote: >>>>> @@ -318,11 +331,87 @@ static inline void p2m_clean_pte(pte_t *p, bool >>>>> clean_pte) >>>>> p2m_write_pte(p, pte, clean_pte); >>>>> } >>>>> >>>>> -static pte_t p2m_pte_from_mfn(mfn_t mfn, p2m_type_t t) >>>>> +static void p2m_set_permission(pte_t *e, p2m_type_t t) >>>>> { >>>>> - panic("%s: hasn't been implemented yet\n", __func__); >>>>> + e->pte &= ~PTE_ACCESS_MASK; >>>>> + >>>>> + e->pte |= PTE_USER; >>>>> + >>>>> + /* >>>>> + * Two schemes to manage the A and D bits are defined: >>>>> + * • The Svade extension: when a virtual page is accessed and the >>>>> A bit >>>>> + * is clear, or is written and the D bit is clear, a page-fault >>>>> + * exception is raised. >>>>> + * • When the Svade extension is not implemented, the following >>>>> scheme >>>>> + * applies. >>>>> + * When a virtual page is accessed and the A bit is clear, the >>>>> PTE is >>>>> + * updated to set the A bit. When the virtual page is written >>>>> and the >>>>> + * D bit is clear, the PTE is updated to set the D bit. When >>>>> G-stage >>>>> + * address translation is in use and is not Bare, the G-stage >>>>> virtual >>>>> + * pages may be accessed or written by implicit accesses to >>>>> VS-level >>>>> + * memory management data structures, such as page tables. >>>>> + * Thereby to avoid a page-fault in case of Svade is available, it is >>>>> + * necesssary to set A and D bits. >>>>> + */ >>>>> + if ( riscv_isa_extension_available(NULL, RISCV_ISA_EXT_svade) ) >>>>> + e->pte |= PTE_ACCESSED | PTE_DIRTY; >>>> All of this depending on menvcfg.ADUE anyway, is this really needed? Isn't >>>> machine mode software responsible for dealing with this kind of page faults >>>> (just like the hypervisor is reponsible for dealing with ones resulting >>>> from henvcfg.ADUE being clear)? >>> In general, I think you are right. >>> >>> In this case, though, I just wanted to avoid unnecessary page faults for >>> now. >>> My understanding is that having such faults handled by the hypervisor can >>> indeed >>> be useful, for example to track which pages are being accessed. However, >>> since we >>> currently don’t track page usage, handling these traps would only result in >>> setting the A and D bits and then returning control to the guest. >> Yet that still be be machine-mode software aiui. By always setting the bits >> we'd >> undermine whatever purpose _they_ have enabled the extension for, wouldn't >> we? > > It’s a good point, and from an architectural perspective, it’s possible that > machine-mode software might want to handle page faults. > However, looking at OpenSBI, it delegates (otherwise all traps/interrupts by > default are going to machine-mode) page faults [1] to lower modes, and I > expect > that other machine-mode software does the same (but of course there is no such > guarantee). > > Therefore, considering that OpenSBI delegates page faults to lower modes and > does not set the A and D bits for p2m (guest) PTEs, this will result in a page > fault being handled by the hypervisor. As a result, we don’t affect the > behavior > of machine-mode software at all. > > If we want to avoid depending on how OpenSBI or other machine-mode software is > implemented, we might instead want to have our own page fault handler in Xen, > and then set the A and D bits within this handler. Won't Xen need its own page fault handler anyway? > Do you think it would be better to do in this way from the start? If yes, then > we also want drop setting of A and D bits for Xen's PTEs [3] to allow M-mode > to > handle S/HS-mode page faults. What I don't really understand is what the intended use of that extension is. Surely every entity should be responsible for its own A/D bits, with lower layers coming into play only when certain things need e.g. emulating. This lack of understanding on my part extends to ... > Interestingly, OpenSBI doesn’t allow hypervisor mode to decide whether to > support Svade or not [2]. By doing so, we can’t set|henvcfg.adue = 1| to > disable > it as menvcfg.adue=0 has more power, which is not very flexible. ... this point, which I was also wondering about before. Jan
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