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Re: [PATCH 09/22] x86/traps: Move load_system_tables() into traps-setup.c
- To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
- From: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2025 10:40:12 +0200
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- Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Xen-devel <xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>
- Delivery-date: Fri, 15 Aug 2025 08:40:16 +0000
- List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>
On 2025-08-15 10:30, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 14.08.2025 20:20, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 14/08/2025 8:26 am, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 13.08.2025 13:36, Andrew Cooper wrote:
On 12/08/2025 10:43 am, Nicola Vetrini wrote:
On 2025-08-08 22:23, Andrew Cooper wrote:
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps-setup.c
b/xen/arch/x86/traps-setup.c
index 8ca379c9e4cb..13b8fcf0ba51 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps-setup.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps-setup.c
@@ -19,6 +20,124 @@ boolean_param("ler", opt_ler);
void nocall entry_PF(void);
+/*
+ * Sets up system tables and descriptors for IDT devliery.
+ *
+ * - Sets up TSS with stack pointers, including ISTs
+ * - Inserts TSS selector into regular and compat GDTs
+ * - Loads GDT, IDT, TR then null LDT
+ * - Sets up IST references in the IDT
+ */
+static void load_system_tables(void)
+{
+ unsigned int i, cpu = smp_processor_id();
+ unsigned long stack_bottom = get_stack_bottom(),
+ stack_top = stack_bottom & ~(STACK_SIZE - 1);
+ /*
+ * NB: define tss_page as a local variable because clang 3.5
doesn't
+ * support using ARRAY_SIZE against per-cpu variables.
+ */
+ struct tss_page *tss_page = &this_cpu(tss_page);
+ idt_entry_t *idt = this_cpu(idt);
+
Given the clang baseline this might not be needed anymore?
Hmm. While true, looking at 51461114e26, the code is definitely
better
written with the tss_page variable and we wouldn't want to go back
to
the old form.
I think that I'll simply drop the comment.
~Andrew
P.S.
Generally speaking, because of the RELOC_HIDE() in this_cpu(), any
time
you ever want two accesses to a variable, it's better (code gen
wise) to
construct a pointer to it and use the point multiple times.
I don't understand why there's a RELOC_HIDE() in this_cpu(). The
justification doesn't make sense, but I've not had time to explore
what
happens if we take it out.
There's no justification in xen/percpu.h?
Well, it's given in compiler.h by RELOC_HIDE().
/* This macro obfuscates arithmetic on a variable address so that gcc
shouldn't recognize the original var, and make assumptions about it
*/
But this is far from convincing.
My understanding is that we simply may not expose any accesses to
per_cpu_*
variables directly to the compiler, or there's a risk that it might
access
the "master" variable (i.e. CPU0's on at least x86).
RELOC_HIDE() doesn't do anything about the correctness of the pointer
arithmetic expression to make the access work.
I don't see how a correct expression can ever access CPU0's data by
accident.
Hmm, upon another look I agree. I wonder whether we inherited this from
Linux, where in turn it may have been merely a workaround to deal with
preemptible code not correctly accessing per-CPU data (i.e. not
accounting for get_per_cpu_offset() not being stable across
preemption).
Yet then per_cpu() would have been of similar concern when "cpu" isn't
properly re-fetched after any possible preemption point ...
Jan
Probably inherited with a stripped-down comment on top of RELOC_HIDE,
see [1]. In a way it does make sense that the compiler may decide to
optimize based on this assumption, though I don't know whether wrapping
is meant to happen with per-CPU variables.
[1]
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v6.16/source/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h#L31
--
Nicola Vetrini, B.Sc.
Software Engineer
BUGSENG (https://bugseng.com)
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/nicola-vetrini-a42471253
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