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Re: [PATCH v9 4/8] vpci: Hide extended capability when it fails to initialize


  • To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@xxxxxxxx>
  • From: Nicola Vetrini <nicola.vetrini@xxxxxxxxxxx>
  • Date: Wed, 30 Jul 2025 12:42:31 +0200
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  • Cc: Jiqian Chen <Jiqian.Chen@xxxxxxx>, Huang Rui <ray.huang@xxxxxxx>, Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@xxxxxxxxxx>, Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@xxxxxxxxxx>, Anthony PERARD <anthony.perard@xxxxxxxxxx>, Michal Orzel <michal.orzel@xxxxxxx>, Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>, Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@xxxxxxxxxx>, xen-devel@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, consulting@xxxxxxxxxxx
  • Delivery-date: Wed, 30 Jul 2025 10:42:37 +0000
  • List-id: Xen developer discussion <xen-devel.lists.xenproject.org>

On 2025-07-30 11:50, Jan Beulich wrote:
On 28.07.2025 07:03, Jiqian Chen wrote:
+static int vpci_ext_capability_hide(
+    const struct pci_dev *pdev, unsigned int cap)
+{
+ const unsigned int offset = pci_find_ext_capability(pdev->sbdf, cap);
+    struct vpci_register *r, *prev_r;
+    struct vpci *vpci = pdev->vpci;
+    uint32_t header, pre_header;
+
+    if ( offset < PCI_CFG_SPACE_SIZE )
+    {
+        ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    spin_lock(&vpci->lock);
+    r = vpci_get_register(vpci, offset, 4);
+    if ( !r )
+    {
+        spin_unlock(&vpci->lock);
+        return -ENODEV;
+    }
+
+    header = (uint32_t)(uintptr_t)r->private;
+    if ( offset == PCI_CFG_SPACE_SIZE )
+    {
+        if ( PCI_EXT_CAP_NEXT(header) <= PCI_CFG_SPACE_SIZE )
+            r->private = (void *)(uintptr_t)0;

Eclair regards this a Misra rule 11.9 violation. Elsewhere we use (void *)0, which I then would conclude is "fine". But I can't say why that is. Cc-ing
Bugseng for a possible explanation.


Hi Jan,

I only see

0|$ git grep "(void\*)0"
xen/include/xen/types.h:#define NULL ((void*)0)

which is fine for R11.9 of course. As Andrew noted, I don't see the need for the use of uintptr_t either.

--
Nicola Vetrini, B.Sc.
Software Engineer
BUGSENG (https://bugseng.com)
LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/nicola-vetrini-a42471253



 


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