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[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] [PATCH v9 3/3] xen/domain: introduce CONFIG_MAX_DOMID
From: Denis Mukhin <dmkhn@xxxxxxxxx>
From: Denis Mukhin <dmukhin@xxxxxxxx>
Embedded deployments of Xen do not need to have support for more than dozen of
domains.
Introduce build-time configuration option to limit the number of domains during
run-time.
Suggested-by: Julien Grall <julien@xxxxxxx>
Signed-off-by: Denis Mukhin <dmukhin@xxxxxxxx>
---
Changes since v8:
- dropped hunk w/ compile-time check for DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED
- updated CONFIG_MAX_DOMID explanation
- dropped public header file changes
---
xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c | 2 +-
xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c | 2 +-
xen/common/Kconfig | 8 ++++++++
xen/common/domain.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
xen/common/sched/core.c | 4 ++--
xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c | 2 +-
6 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
index 1c348e557d..ee8ddd33b0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/mcheck/mce.c
@@ -1493,7 +1493,7 @@ long do_mca(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_mc_t) u_xen_mc)
d = rcu_lock_domain_by_any_id(mc_msrinject->mcinj_domid);
if ( d == NULL )
{
- if ( mc_msrinject->mcinj_domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+ if ( mc_msrinject->mcinj_domid >= CONFIG_MAX_DOMID )
return x86_mcerr("do_mca inject: incompatible flag "
"MC_MSRINJ_F_GPADDR with domain %d",
-EINVAL, domid);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c
index c28192ea26..67d423e088 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ void vpmu_do_interrupt(void)
* in XENPMU_MODE_ALL, for everyone.
*/
if ( (vpmu_mode & XENPMU_MODE_ALL) ||
- (sampled->domain->domain_id >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED) )
+ (sampled->domain->domain_id >= CONFIG_MAX_DOMID) )
{
sampling = choose_hwdom_vcpu();
if ( !sampling )
diff --git a/xen/common/Kconfig b/xen/common/Kconfig
index 3d66d09397..ef083856b8 100644
--- a/xen/common/Kconfig
+++ b/xen/common/Kconfig
@@ -579,4 +579,12 @@ config BUDDY_ALLOCATOR_SIZE
Amount of memory reserved for the buddy allocator to serve Xen heap,
working alongside the colored one.
+config MAX_DOMID
+ int "Maximum domain ID"
+ range 1 32752
+ default 32752
+ help
+ Specifies the maximum domain ID (dom0 or late hwdom, predefined
+ domains, post-boot domains, excluding Xen system domains).
+
endmenu
diff --git a/xen/common/domain.c b/xen/common/domain.c
index 129b4fcb37..87e5be35e5 100644
--- a/xen/common/domain.c
+++ b/xen/common/domain.c
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ struct domain *domain_list;
/* Non-system domain ID allocator. */
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(domid_lock);
-static DECLARE_BITMAP(domid_bitmap, DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED);
+static DECLARE_BITMAP(domid_bitmap, CONFIG_MAX_DOMID);
/*
* Insert a domain into the domlist/hash. This allows the domain to be looked
@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ int domain_init_states(void)
ASSERT(rw_is_write_locked_by_me(¤t->domain->event_lock));
dom_state_changed = xvzalloc_array(unsigned long,
- BITS_TO_LONGS(DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED));
+ BITS_TO_LONGS(CONFIG_MAX_DOMID));
if ( !dom_state_changed )
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -234,7 +234,7 @@ int get_domain_state(struct xen_domctl_get_domain_state
*info, struct domain *d,
while ( dom_state_changed )
{
dom = find_first_bit(dom_state_changed, DOMID_MASK + 1);
- if ( dom >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+ if ( dom >= CONFIG_MAX_DOMID )
break;
if ( test_and_clear_bit(dom, dom_state_changed) )
{
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ struct domain *domain_create(domid_t domid,
/* Sort out our idea of is_hardware_domain(). */
if ( (flags & CDF_hardware) || domid == hardware_domid )
{
- if ( hardware_domid < 0 || hardware_domid >= DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+ if ( hardware_domid < 0 || hardware_domid >= CONFIG_MAX_DOMID )
panic("The value of hardware_dom must be a valid domain ID\n");
/* late_hwdom is only allowed for dom0. */
@@ -2413,9 +2413,11 @@ domid_t get_initial_domain_id(void)
domid_t domid_alloc(domid_t domid)
{
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED < CONFIG_MAX_DOMID);
+
spin_lock(&domid_lock);
- if ( domid < DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+ if ( domid < CONFIG_MAX_DOMID )
{
if ( __test_and_set_bit(domid, domid_bitmap) )
domid = DOMID_INVALID;
@@ -2427,13 +2429,13 @@ domid_t domid_alloc(domid_t domid)
const domid_t reserved_domid = get_initial_domain_id();
const bool reserved = __test_and_set_bit(reserved_domid, domid_bitmap);
- domid = find_next_zero_bit(domid_bitmap, DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED,
+ domid = find_next_zero_bit(domid_bitmap, CONFIG_MAX_DOMID,
domid_last);
- if ( domid == DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
- domid = find_next_zero_bit(domid_bitmap, DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED, 0);
+ if ( domid == CONFIG_MAX_DOMID )
+ domid = find_next_zero_bit(domid_bitmap, CONFIG_MAX_DOMID, 0);
- if ( domid == DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+ if ( domid == CONFIG_MAX_DOMID )
{
domid = DOMID_INVALID;
}
diff --git a/xen/common/sched/core.c b/xen/common/sched/core.c
index 9043414290..f1bfb6f6a2 100644
--- a/xen/common/sched/core.c
+++ b/xen/common/sched/core.c
@@ -867,7 +867,7 @@ int sched_init_domain(struct domain *d, unsigned int poolid)
int ret;
ASSERT(d->cpupool == NULL);
- ASSERT(d->domain_id < DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED);
+ ASSERT(d->domain_id < CONFIG_MAX_DOMID);
if ( (ret = cpupool_add_domain(d, poolid)) )
return ret;
@@ -891,7 +891,7 @@ int sched_init_domain(struct domain *d, unsigned int poolid)
void sched_destroy_domain(struct domain *d)
{
- ASSERT(d->domain_id < DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED);
+ ASSERT(d->domain_id < CONFIG_MAX_DOMID);
if ( d->cpupool )
{
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
index c55f02c97e..5df85ca629 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/vtd/iommu.c
@@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ int domain_context_mapping_one(
prev_did = context_domain_id(lctxt);
domid = did_to_domain_id(iommu, prev_did);
- if ( domid < DOMID_FIRST_RESERVED )
+ if ( domid < CONFIG_MAX_DOMID )
prev_dom = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(domid);
else if ( pdev ? domid == pdev->arch.pseudo_domid : domid > DOMID_MASK
)
prev_dom = rcu_lock_domain(dom_io);
--
2.34.1
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