[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index] Re: [PATCH] xen/x86: allow Dom0 PVH to call XENMEM_exchange
On Mon, 28 Apr 2025, Jan Beulich wrote: > On 25.04.2025 22:19, Stefano Stabellini wrote: > > From: Xenia Ragiadakou <Xenia.Ragiadakou@xxxxxxx> > > > > Dom0 PVH might need XENMEM_exchange when passing contiguous memory > > addresses to firmware or co-processors not behind an IOMMU. > > I definitely don't understand the firmware part: It's subject to the > same transparent P2M translations as the rest of the VM; it's just > another piece of software running there. > > "Co-processors not behind an IOMMU" is also interesting; a more > concrete scenario might be nice, yet I realize you may be limited in > what you're allowed to say. Sure. On AMD x86 platforms there is a co-processor called PSP running TEE firmware. The PSP is not behind an IOMMU. Dom0 needs occasionally to pass addresses to it. See drivers/tee/amdtee/ and include/linux/psp-tee.h in Linux. This is not a new problem. On ARM we have been dealing with this kind of issues for more than a decade and it is the reason why originally the decision was to run Dom0 1:1 mapped on ARM. I am not suggesting to map Dom0 PVH 1:1; I am only providing context and highlighting that we have been lucky on x86 :-) > > XENMEM_exchange was blocked for HVM/PVH DomUs, and accidentally it > > impacted Dom0 PVH as well. > > This wasn't accidental at all, I don't think. You as the original author of the patch (fae7d5be8bb) in question would surely know better. But the way the commit message was written was pointing toward a Dom0/DeviceModel problem: "The operation's success can't be controlled by the guest, as the device model may have an active mapping of the page." > > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c > > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c > > @@ -4401,7 +4401,7 @@ int steal_page( > > const struct domain *owner; > > int rc; > > > > - if ( paging_mode_external(d) ) > > + if ( paging_mode_external(d) && !is_hardware_domain(d) ) > > return -EOPNOTSUPP; > > > > /* Grab a reference to make sure the page doesn't change under our > > feet */ > > Is this (in particular the code following below here) a safe thing to do > when we don't properly refcount page references from the P2M, yet? It's > Dom0, yes, but even there I might see potential security implications (as > top violating privacy of a guest). I don't think I am following, could you please elaborate more? The change I am proposing is to allow Dom0 to share its own pages to the co-processor. DomUs are not in the picture. I would be happy to add further restriction to that effect. Is there something else you have in mind? > Furthermore cleanup_page_mappings() (called later in the function) has a > PV-only aspect which would apparently need widening to PVH Dom0 then, > too. You are referring to: if ( d && unlikely(need_iommu_pt_sync(d)) && is_pv_domain(d) ) rc = iommu_legacy_unmap(d, _dfn(mfn), 1u << PAGE_ORDER_4K); is that correct? > > --- a/xen/common/memory.c > > +++ b/xen/common/memory.c > > @@ -794,7 +794,7 @@ static long > > memory_exchange(XEN_GUEST_HANDLE_PARAM(xen_memory_exchange_t) arg) > > rc = guest_physmap_add_page(d, _gfn(gpfn), mfn, > > exch.out.extent_order) ?: rc; > > > > - if ( !paging_mode_translate(d) && > > + if ( (!paging_mode_translate(d) || is_hardware_domain(d)) && > > __copy_mfn_to_guest_offset(exch.out.extent_start, > > (i << out_chunk_order) + j, > > mfn) ) > > Wait, no: A PVH domain (Dom0 or not) can't very well make use of MFNs, can > it? One way or another Dom0 PVH needs to know the MFN to pass it to the co-processor.
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